Ukraine
You beat me to it^ New update from Cooper today
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Generally, the mass of the frontline remained where it was in mid-January. That said, the VSRF has launched at least two powerful counterattacks, and whatever is left of Wagner is still attacking in the Bakhmut area. However, the price extracted by Ukrainians is so massive that meanwhile it’s primarily the VSRF’s and VDV’s ‘mobiks’ that are assaulting. In this regards it’s fascinating to monitor how Putin and his generals seem to remain insistent on demonstrating they not only have no other ideas but ‘frontal infantry assault with some mechanised- and lots of artillery support’, but simply no solutions for predicament into which they’ve put themselves.
Kupyansk… kind of ‘no news’, except for sporadic exchanges of artillery fire.
Svatove… since the failure of all the Russian counterattacks on Novoselivske, no news. Sure, some of related videos were shown VSRF’s tanks driving around the edge of the village, but they’ve failed to recover it. In turn, Ukrainians didn’t launch new attacks in direction of Svatove. Seems, both sides are preoccupied with bringing reinforcements and improving their current positions.
Kremina… Some 4–5 days ago, the VSRF launched a powerful counterattack in this area, involving the 237th Armoured Regiment, the BARS-13, at least two motor rifle regiments, and well-supported by artillery. Have driven Ukrainians away from the northern and southern fringes of the town, but failed to advance in western direction, on on Zarichne and Torske, for example. Actually, the centre prong of that counterattack was stopped cold well to the east of Dibrova. This was a costly operation involving too few forces to achieve anything meaningful, and run in dumb manner: frontally. It’s so pointless, I cannot but wonder about its exact intention. Perhaps it can be described as ‘successful in tying four brigades of the ZSU’ in this area’? See: buying yet more time for construction of the Russian ‘defence in depth’ along the P66 highway, further east. (As mentioned earlier, the VSRF is working feverishly on establishing a massive line of fortifications, all protected by deep minefields, all along the frontline from the border in north-western Luhansk, all the way down to the Dnipro River.)
Bakhmut…. This is the only area where the Russians managed to make some advances, the last two weeks. Even then, and ‘up front’: reports from ZSU units deployed there are kind of ‘no problem, everything’s fine’ — and that regardless of what is going on. More precisely:
North of Bakhmut, on 25 January, the Wagner and VDV have crossed the Bakhmutska River and advanced into Blahodatne with the aim of assaulting northern Paraskoviivka and Krasna Hora in the south, but also from Blahodatne towards the M03 highway in the west. Blahodatne turned out to be largely empty of Ukrainian troops, though: instead, they’ve entrenched in the hills west and above the village, thus having an excellent field of fire upon whatever is moving below them. Moreover, the ZSU has meanwhile brought in another artillery brigade (at least third, if nor the fourth…I know of the 40th, 43rd and 45th there; now they’ve been reinforced by another one) to the Bakhmut area, and subjected the Russians to such barrages that WarGonzo was left into village on 29 January, only. That said, even as of the last evening, Wagner still had no firm control of the village: it was losing troops while trying to establish any kind of positions there.
Eastern Bakhmut: Russians claiming this or that house, or this or that section of this and that street….but actually going nowhere.
Klishchivka… the ZSU definitely withdrew out of the village, but is in firm control of the hill above it, on the western side, and thus smashing whatever is trying to come its way — or trying to bypass south of Klishchivka, in direction of Stupochky.
Bottom line: Bakhmut remains in Ukrainian control, the M03 and the road to Kostyantyvka remain open for the flow of Ukrainian reinforcements and supplies (and evacuation of the wounded). Indeed, the reorganisation of the ZSU garrison seems to have been completed. The 61st and 63rd Mech, supported by the 4th Tank, are now holding the line north of the town; the 1st Special, the 3rd Assault, the 24th Mech and the 57th Motor Rifle are holding Bakhmut, and the 28th and 60th Mech are holding the southern side. Foremost: instead of ‘elements from too many units’, most of involved brigades are now present in full force — and that usually means they have all of their 4–5 battalions in this area (yup: the mass of ZSU brigades nowadays include 4–5 battalions; several have 6). Several brigades are held ‘in reserve’ west of the town, too.
Note for the end: pay attention at the lack of effectiveness of the Russian artillery. This is still superior in numbers to that of the ZSU (at least some 5–6 times), but — and as ‘announced’ already back in June-July 2022 — due to the cold weather, it’s Orlan UAVs are out of action (or when used, crashing, having frozen optics etc.). The VSRF remains short on forward controllers, and its communication remain poor. Thus, and for most of the time, the VSRF’s artillery is firing ‘blind’. Of course, it must be expected this to change as soon as the weather gets better. In turn, the VKS is nowadays often forced to intervene with its Mi-24s and Ka-52s (not sure if all of the takes in the latter video are ‘recent’).
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Generally, the mass of the frontline remained where it was in mid-January. That said, the VSRF has launched at least two powerful counterattacks, and whatever is left of Wagner is still attacking in the Bakhmut area. However, the price extracted by Ukrainians is so massive that meanwhile it’s primarily the VSRF’s and VDV’s ‘mobiks’ that are assaulting. In this regards it’s fascinating to monitor how Putin and his generals seem to remain insistent on demonstrating they not only have no other ideas but ‘frontal infantry assault with some mechanised- and lots of artillery support’, but simply no solutions for predicament into which they’ve put themselves.
Kupyansk… kind of ‘no news’, except for sporadic exchanges of artillery fire.
Svatove… since the failure of all the Russian counterattacks on Novoselivske, no news. Sure, some of related videos were shown VSRF’s tanks driving around the edge of the village, but they’ve failed to recover it. In turn, Ukrainians didn’t launch new attacks in direction of Svatove. Seems, both sides are preoccupied with bringing reinforcements and improving their current positions.
Kremina… Some 4–5 days ago, the VSRF launched a powerful counterattack in this area, involving the 237th Armoured Regiment, the BARS-13, at least two motor rifle regiments, and well-supported by artillery. Have driven Ukrainians away from the northern and southern fringes of the town, but failed to advance in western direction, on on Zarichne and Torske, for example. Actually, the centre prong of that counterattack was stopped cold well to the east of Dibrova. This was a costly operation involving too few forces to achieve anything meaningful, and run in dumb manner: frontally. It’s so pointless, I cannot but wonder about its exact intention. Perhaps it can be described as ‘successful in tying four brigades of the ZSU’ in this area’? See: buying yet more time for construction of the Russian ‘defence in depth’ along the P66 highway, further east. (As mentioned earlier, the VSRF is working feverishly on establishing a massive line of fortifications, all protected by deep minefields, all along the frontline from the border in north-western Luhansk, all the way down to the Dnipro River.)
Bakhmut…. This is the only area where the Russians managed to make some advances, the last two weeks. Even then, and ‘up front’: reports from ZSU units deployed there are kind of ‘no problem, everything’s fine’ — and that regardless of what is going on. More precisely:
North of Bakhmut, on 25 January, the Wagner and VDV have crossed the Bakhmutska River and advanced into Blahodatne with the aim of assaulting northern Paraskoviivka and Krasna Hora in the south, but also from Blahodatne towards the M03 highway in the west. Blahodatne turned out to be largely empty of Ukrainian troops, though: instead, they’ve entrenched in the hills west and above the village, thus having an excellent field of fire upon whatever is moving below them. Moreover, the ZSU has meanwhile brought in another artillery brigade (at least third, if nor the fourth…I know of the 40th, 43rd and 45th there; now they’ve been reinforced by another one) to the Bakhmut area, and subjected the Russians to such barrages that WarGonzo was left into village on 29 January, only. That said, even as of the last evening, Wagner still had no firm control of the village: it was losing troops while trying to establish any kind of positions there.
Eastern Bakhmut: Russians claiming this or that house, or this or that section of this and that street….but actually going nowhere.
Klishchivka… the ZSU definitely withdrew out of the village, but is in firm control of the hill above it, on the western side, and thus smashing whatever is trying to come its way — or trying to bypass south of Klishchivka, in direction of Stupochky.
Bottom line: Bakhmut remains in Ukrainian control, the M03 and the road to Kostyantyvka remain open for the flow of Ukrainian reinforcements and supplies (and evacuation of the wounded). Indeed, the reorganisation of the ZSU garrison seems to have been completed. The 61st and 63rd Mech, supported by the 4th Tank, are now holding the line north of the town; the 1st Special, the 3rd Assault, the 24th Mech and the 57th Motor Rifle are holding Bakhmut, and the 28th and 60th Mech are holding the southern side. Foremost: instead of ‘elements from too many units’, most of involved brigades are now present in full force — and that usually means they have all of their 4–5 battalions in this area (yup: the mass of ZSU brigades nowadays include 4–5 battalions; several have 6). Several brigades are held ‘in reserve’ west of the town, too.
Note for the end: pay attention at the lack of effectiveness of the Russian artillery. This is still superior in numbers to that of the ZSU (at least some 5–6 times), but — and as ‘announced’ already back in June-July 2022 — due to the cold weather, it’s Orlan UAVs are out of action (or when used, crashing, having frozen optics etc.). The VSRF remains short on forward controllers, and its communication remain poor. Thus, and for most of the time, the VSRF’s artillery is firing ‘blind’. Of course, it must be expected this to change as soon as the weather gets better. In turn, the VKS is nowadays often forced to intervene with its Mi-24s and Ka-52s (not sure if all of the takes in the latter video are ‘recent’).
- Prahok
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The Russo-Ukraine War is having a direct impact on the future of Moldova. What that future is may very well be determined by the outcome of the War.
https://www.dw.com/en/russia-steps-up-t ... a-64612019
https://www.dw.com/en/russia-steps-up-t ... a-64612019
- Prahok
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End of Week 50 of the Russo-Ukrainian War and there are increasing signs that Russia is preparing for a major offensive in the coming weeks. There is speculation this is being brought forward to occur before Ukrainian forces are able to incorporate incoming modern main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Activity across the Donbas reportedly increased, whilst other sectors are relatively quiet.
In the West, North and North East there were no changes on the ground.
In Belarus, there were no reported changes to the posture of Russian or Belarusian troops.
In Luhansk, Russia is trying to regain the initiative with offensive actions towards Kupyansk and pushing West from Kreminna. There were no reported material success to date, however the change in intent is apparent.
In Donetsk, Russia continues to grind forwards around Bakhmut, most successfully to the North, and are fighting within the Eastern outskirts. There were no reported changes elsewhere, though the Russian offensive near Adviika appears to have resumed.
In Zaporizhzhia, there was a prisoner exchange during the week, but no changes along the front line.
In Kherson, there were no reported changes.
In the West, North and North East there were no changes on the ground.
In Belarus, there were no reported changes to the posture of Russian or Belarusian troops.
In Luhansk, Russia is trying to regain the initiative with offensive actions towards Kupyansk and pushing West from Kreminna. There were no reported material success to date, however the change in intent is apparent.
In Donetsk, Russia continues to grind forwards around Bakhmut, most successfully to the North, and are fighting within the Eastern outskirts. There were no reported changes elsewhere, though the Russian offensive near Adviika appears to have resumed.
In Zaporizhzhia, there was a prisoner exchange during the week, but no changes along the front line.
In Kherson, there were no reported changes.
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- Prahok
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It appears Wagner PMC ceased recruitment from Russian prisons, which will likely mean the end of the human-wave attacks from the "death battalions". There is much speculation as to the rationale, however no doubt Wagner PMC's inability to enter Bakhmut despite the incredibly high cost over many months played a role.
There were reports from late last year that Russian military was taking over prison recruitment as a source of manpower, though I've yet to see anything official beyond prison labour for armament industries.
There were reports from late last year that Russian military was taking over prison recruitment as a source of manpower, though I've yet to see anything official beyond prison labour for armament industries.
Bakhmut seems still just about in Ukrainian hands, but Russian forces making slow progress towards total control- at massive costs of men and equipment.
Reports for example of the Russian Alga Battalion starting like this;
ending like this
Not 100% sure this is the same unit, but claimed to be.
It's looking like the Ukranians are starting to withdraw to higher ground and the Bakhmutska River, with only one road to Bakhmut left open for the Ukrainians.
Looks like the town will be lost sooner rather than later, but not without further huge losses for Team Putin.
Most reports have been very critical of Ukraine military leadership on this front for the past few weeks, so some changes may be made soon, and expectations of a possible counterattack here or on a weaker part of the Donbas line.
Reports for example of the Russian Alga Battalion starting like this;
ending like this
Not 100% sure this is the same unit, but claimed to be.
It's looking like the Ukranians are starting to withdraw to higher ground and the Bakhmutska River, with only one road to Bakhmut left open for the Ukrainians.
Looks like the town will be lost sooner rather than later, but not without further huge losses for Team Putin.
Most reports have been very critical of Ukraine military leadership on this front for the past few weeks, so some changes may be made soon, and expectations of a possible counterattack here or on a weaker part of the Donbas line.
- Prahok
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Good overview of the situation.Nerd wrote: ↑Sat Feb 11, 2023 11:22 amLooks like the town will be lost sooner rather than later, but not without further huge losses for Team Putin.
The much anticipated Russian offensive appears to have started a week or two ago, with Ukraine pushed back in several areas and Russia losing significant amounts of armour around Vuhledar.
Have you seen these?
The Putapologistas will scream 'fake'. Interviews with Russian and separatist POWs, supposedly under own free will. War is hell.
https://www.youtube.com/@zolkinvolodymyr9639/videos
The Putapologistas will scream 'fake'. Interviews with Russian and separatist POWs, supposedly under own free will. War is hell.
https://www.youtube.com/@zolkinvolodymyr9639/videos
Agree with both of you. The only difference is that Russia has people to fill the people gaps, be it voluntarily or by force, Ukraine doesn't. Hardware can only be used if it is manned.Prahok wrote: ↑Sat Feb 11, 2023 5:32 pmGood overview of the situation.Nerd wrote: ↑Sat Feb 11, 2023 11:22 amLooks like the town will be lost sooner rather than later, but not without further huge losses for Team Putin.
The much anticipated Russian offensive appears to have started a week or two ago, with Ukraine pushed back in several areas and Russia losing significant amounts of armour around Vuhledar.
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The manpower issue is a complicated one.drazilovich wrote: ↑Sun Feb 12, 2023 6:02 amAgree with both of you. The only difference is that Russia has people to fill the people gaps, be it voluntarily or by force, Ukraine doesn't. Hardware can only be used if it is manned.
Technically, Ukraine have the larger number of ground forces committed to the conflict due to national mobilisation. Russia have a larger number of forces overall as well as population base to draw upon, however have legal and social constraints regarding the usage of conscripts.
To counter this, Russia conducts various exercises in Belarus and small, ground actions along the Northern border. This results in Ukraine committing troops to its entire Belarus/Russian border, including strategic depth, whereas Russia need not as both sides know Ukraine will not invade Russia.
As a result, it is unclear as to the strength, depth and quality of reserves either side has in Luhansk and Donetsk (as it should be, as neither side has an interest in advertising). Generally, both sides discover such information the hard way.
Thank you, prahok, as always unbiased and informative.
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End of Week 51 of the Russo-Ukrainian War with the steadily increasing activity from Russian forces over the past two weeks suggesting the Russian offensive is well and truly underway.
In the West, North and North East there were no changes on the ground.
In Belarus, there were no reported changes to the posture of Russian or Belarusian troops.
In Luhansk, the Russian offensive North East of Kupyansk appears to have slowed, though still progressing with Ukraine likely pushed out of Dvorichne. The Russian offensive West of Kremmina reportedly made some progress through the forest, reaching Ukrainian positions near Torske.
In Donetsk, Russian forces continued their push North and South of Bakhmut as well as pushing into the Eastern suburbs. If Ukrainian ground lines of communication are sufficiently threatened then their position in the city may become untenable. Yesterday Ukraine counter-attacked in three areas, reversing some recent Russian gains, however the general trend has been one of grinding Russian advances. The Russian offensive around Adviika continued throughout the week with no changes on the ground. Russia continued its offensive against Vuhledar, losing a substantial amount of armour (both main battle tanks and BMPs) in the process.
In Zaporizhzhia, there were continued reports of Russian forces being moved to Mariupol. This has reportedly been going on for some time. There were small actions along the front, however no changes in territory.
In Kherson, skirmishes continue on islands on the Dnipro, however no substantive actions took place.
In Moldova, President Maia Sandu accused Russia of planning to foment civil unrest in order to overthrow the government. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/ ... row-a80214
The main thrusts of the Russian offensive as displayed by @DefMon3
In the West, North and North East there were no changes on the ground.
In Belarus, there were no reported changes to the posture of Russian or Belarusian troops.
In Luhansk, the Russian offensive North East of Kupyansk appears to have slowed, though still progressing with Ukraine likely pushed out of Dvorichne. The Russian offensive West of Kremmina reportedly made some progress through the forest, reaching Ukrainian positions near Torske.
In Donetsk, Russian forces continued their push North and South of Bakhmut as well as pushing into the Eastern suburbs. If Ukrainian ground lines of communication are sufficiently threatened then their position in the city may become untenable. Yesterday Ukraine counter-attacked in three areas, reversing some recent Russian gains, however the general trend has been one of grinding Russian advances. The Russian offensive around Adviika continued throughout the week with no changes on the ground. Russia continued its offensive against Vuhledar, losing a substantial amount of armour (both main battle tanks and BMPs) in the process.
In Zaporizhzhia, there were continued reports of Russian forces being moved to Mariupol. This has reportedly been going on for some time. There were small actions along the front, however no changes in territory.
In Kherson, skirmishes continue on islands on the Dnipro, however no substantive actions took place.
In Moldova, President Maia Sandu accused Russia of planning to foment civil unrest in order to overthrow the government. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/ ... row-a80214
The main thrusts of the Russian offensive as displayed by @DefMon3
I have been saying this for months. These propaganda videos are not to be believed. Most of the time the drone videos are not clear or the action jumps about to different dates and times, along with dramatic music etc.
As an example. In this video 21 and 22 are the same tanks as 28 and 29. Could not be bothered to look at the whole video, but they are the ones that stood out.
pew, pew, pew, pew!
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Most footage is legitimate however too often attributed to the wrong location or time. Much of the recent footage from Vuhledar regarding the 155th is accepted as legitimate by both sides. Still, footage is regularly manipulated which is frustrating given the plethora of legitimate material.YaTingPom wrote: I have been saying this for months. These propaganda videos are not to be believed
The primary issue is that one swallow doth not a Summer make.
The front is so long, and actions so frequent, that almost any legitimate footage can be found to fit whatever narrative one chooses.
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