Ukraine
- Prahok
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As Kyiv celebrated its 1541st birthday, Russia launched a large air assault on the city, including the largest ever drone attack. It followed this up the following night and next day with further missile & drone assaults.
Today Moscow was subject to an air assault by a number of drones (estimates vary); Ukraine has yet to comment though the head of Wagner, Prigozhin, had some choice words for the Russian Ministry of Defence.
Earlier Russia put out an arrest warrant for Lindsey Graham in relation to comments he made about US weapon support for Ukraine.
Today Moscow was subject to an air assault by a number of drones (estimates vary); Ukraine has yet to comment though the head of Wagner, Prigozhin, had some choice words for the Russian Ministry of Defence.
Earlier Russia put out an arrest warrant for Lindsey Graham in relation to comments he made about US weapon support for Ukraine.
- Sonic1
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Ukraine lost a couple Tanks and support vehicles when they clustered too closely together and were shelled by Russian artillery. Ukraine has gone silent about their offensive lately, kudos for maintaining discipline and operational security.
Freedom is not a state. It is an act. It is not some enchanted garden perched high on a distant plateau.. Freedom is a continuous action we all must take, and each generation must do its part to create an even more fair, more just society.-John Lewis
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported Ukrainian gains, with an unexpected attack on Kharkiv to the north.
In Donetsk, both sides reporting a Ukrainian breakthrough in Neskuchne, with "Almost the entire forward defense line of the Russian army near Velyka Novosilka - around 20 km long - has been wiped out. Ukrainian forces liberated Neskuchne and Novodonets'ke."
This suggests a thrust towards Mariupol, or maybe the start of an attempt to cut off an encircle Donetsk (which would be a major psychological victory).
The test will be on the Russian lines which are said to be falling back to see if they will reorganise or parts of the front will crumble with Ukraine keeping up pressure elsewhere to draw Russian forces.
This is going to get interesting over the next few days/weeks.
In Donetsk, both sides reporting a Ukrainian breakthrough in Neskuchne, with "Almost the entire forward defense line of the Russian army near Velyka Novosilka - around 20 km long - has been wiped out. Ukrainian forces liberated Neskuchne and Novodonets'ke."
This suggests a thrust towards Mariupol, or maybe the start of an attempt to cut off an encircle Donetsk (which would be a major psychological victory).
The test will be on the Russian lines which are said to be falling back to see if they will reorganise or parts of the front will crumble with Ukraine keeping up pressure elsewhere to draw Russian forces.
This is going to get interesting over the next few days/weeks.
- Prahok
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Very much wait and see at this juncture. Ukraine appears to be taking ground at various sections of the front, however unless Russia's second lines of defence are breached there won't be a need for Russia to commit its reserves, subsequently leaving other sections of the front vulnerable.Nerd wrote: ↑Sun Jun 11, 2023 12:18 pmUkrainian and Russian sources reported Ukrainian gains, with an unexpected attack on Kharkiv to the north.
In Donetsk, both sides reporting a Ukrainian breakthrough in Neskuchne, with "Almost the entire forward defense line of the Russian army near Velyka Novosilka - around 20 km long - has been wiped out. Ukrainian forces liberated Neskuchne and Novodonets'ke."
This suggests a thrust towards Mariupol, or maybe the start of an attempt to cut off an encircle Donetsk (which would be a major psychological victory).
The test will be on the Russian lines which are said to be falling back to see if they will reorganise or parts of the front will crumble with Ukraine keeping up pressure elsewhere to draw Russian forces.
This is going to get interesting over the next few days/weeks.
Kharkiv/Luhansk is interesting, as Russia may have sent its most capable combat units & reserves to the Bakhmut & Zaporizhzhia fronts. Over the last day or so there has been chatter amongst the Russian milblogger community regarding sighting of large Ukrainain formations near Kupyansk.
BATTLE OF DONBAS
Kupyansk-Svatove….Russians claim a new Ukrainian offensive in this area is in the making; there’s no ‘beep’ from the other side.
Bakhmut… ZSU is continuing to grind north and south of the ruined town, causing heavy losses to the defending VSRF in the process. In the north has reached Berkhivka, but in the south the fighting is still outside Klishchivka.
Avdiivka….Diversionary ZSU attacks at three points (two north-, one south of the town).
ZAPORIZHZHYA FRONT
Orikhiv… sadly, the 33rd and 47th Brigades are not getting through. Two days ago, they punched from Lobkove in south-western direction all the way to Luhove: were repelled and forced to withdraw all the way back. That said, sustained attacks in this area – while costly in terms of Leopards and M2 Bradleys, have forced the 58th CAA to bring the 22nd Spetsnaz brigade from the 2nd, to the first line of defence. Ironically, all the attention of both the Russian and the Western media is focused on this sector, ‘because that’s where Leopards are’, and the Russians can show so many photos and videos…
Hulaipolye… similar: ZSU managed only minor dents in the Russian defences.
Zemledeliye ISDM, the Russian mine-sowing multiple rocket launcher: one of major reasons for failures of several ZSU attacks in the southern Zaporizhzhya. Essentially, whenever the Russians detect a new Ukrainian mechanised attack, they’re using this system to deploy additional minefields. When Ukrainians hit the same, suffer damage and stop, the Russians then call Ka-52 attack helicopters, artillery- and air strikes on them.
Velyka Novosilka….or, what the Russians call the ‘Vremivka Bulge’….this is from where there are best news for the ZSU, the last few days. Essentially, a group of (motorised) infantry- and mechanised formations of the ZSU breached through with an ‘unspectacular’ infantry attack and is ever since running amok in the Russian rear.
Sadly, the map of developments of the last four days, drawn by Don Hill, is only partially ready, but here you are: the ZSU run a series of nocturnal attacks along the eastern side of the Mokri Yaly River, usually starting in southern direction, before turning west, into the Russian back. The river is the seam between the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA; western side) and the 35th CAA (eastern side). This caught the Russians entirely unprepared and caused them massive losses. Example: the first to get overrun, the VSRF garrison of Neskuchne, counted 200: 60 were confirmed killed, 2-3 captured, the rest run away. It was similar in Blahodatne, Stoozheve, Makarivka, Staromayorske, and Urozhane. Eventually, the 60th Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB) and the 366th Naval Infantry Brigade were mauled and fell apart. As they began fleeing down the road running west of the Mokri Yaly, got ambushed at multiple points, suffering yet additional losses.
Something similar happened when the Russians brought in their ‘operational reserve’ in form of the 127th MRD, from the 3rd defence line up to the Staromlynivka area and ordered it into a counterattack, on 10 June. This move was detected by ZSU on time and the division heavily shelled already while preparing this attack in the Staromlynivka area, suffering numerous losses in tanks and guns.
Nevertheless, the Russians counterattacked. One prong went around Staromayorske to the north and attempted to recover Storozheve. There it run into the infantry of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence and was ambushed, suffering numerous losses. Another went east of the river and tried to hit the ZSU in Urozhaine from the east, but run into ambushes and mines and suffered heavy losses. Moreover, Ukrainians (apparently. 35th Naval Infantry and the 3rd Mechanised) then liberated Novodonetske and hit that Russian counterattack into its eastern flank… Finally, apparently on 11 June, the 127th counterattacked on Makarivka, and suffered heavy losses again, enabling Ukrainians to relaunch their advance and reach Staormlynivka, yesterday in the morning: ever since, there is bitter fighting inside this village (or small town, if you like).
Moreover, Ukrainians have hit the HQ of the 35th CAA, killing its Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Sergey Goryachev (said to have been a skilled commander).
Note: no matter if in the Bakhmut or in the Velyka Novosilka area, it’s interesting to watch the ZSU infantry fairing so much better than its armour, by night and by day, in static- or in manoeuvre warfare (indeed: easily outmatching whatever the Russians throw its way), as so often in this war…
Vuhledar…there are lots of reports indicating bitter fighting south-east of the town, approximately between Blahodatne and Volnovakha. Apparently, ZSU might have reached the Blahodatne area, back on 7-8 June, before the VSRF launched a counterattack from the east (with reserves re-deployed from the Donetsk area). The counterattack might have been partially successful in slowing down Ukrainian advance, but was then stopped and the troops in question re-deployed into defence positions south of Volnovakha. That, however, is about all I know regarding what’s going on there.
Kupyansk-Svatove….Russians claim a new Ukrainian offensive in this area is in the making; there’s no ‘beep’ from the other side.
Bakhmut… ZSU is continuing to grind north and south of the ruined town, causing heavy losses to the defending VSRF in the process. In the north has reached Berkhivka, but in the south the fighting is still outside Klishchivka.
Avdiivka….Diversionary ZSU attacks at three points (two north-, one south of the town).
ZAPORIZHZHYA FRONT
Orikhiv… sadly, the 33rd and 47th Brigades are not getting through. Two days ago, they punched from Lobkove in south-western direction all the way to Luhove: were repelled and forced to withdraw all the way back. That said, sustained attacks in this area – while costly in terms of Leopards and M2 Bradleys, have forced the 58th CAA to bring the 22nd Spetsnaz brigade from the 2nd, to the first line of defence. Ironically, all the attention of both the Russian and the Western media is focused on this sector, ‘because that’s where Leopards are’, and the Russians can show so many photos and videos…
Hulaipolye… similar: ZSU managed only minor dents in the Russian defences.
Zemledeliye ISDM, the Russian mine-sowing multiple rocket launcher: one of major reasons for failures of several ZSU attacks in the southern Zaporizhzhya. Essentially, whenever the Russians detect a new Ukrainian mechanised attack, they’re using this system to deploy additional minefields. When Ukrainians hit the same, suffer damage and stop, the Russians then call Ka-52 attack helicopters, artillery- and air strikes on them.
Velyka Novosilka….or, what the Russians call the ‘Vremivka Bulge’….this is from where there are best news for the ZSU, the last few days. Essentially, a group of (motorised) infantry- and mechanised formations of the ZSU breached through with an ‘unspectacular’ infantry attack and is ever since running amok in the Russian rear.
Sadly, the map of developments of the last four days, drawn by Don Hill, is only partially ready, but here you are: the ZSU run a series of nocturnal attacks along the eastern side of the Mokri Yaly River, usually starting in southern direction, before turning west, into the Russian back. The river is the seam between the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA; western side) and the 35th CAA (eastern side). This caught the Russians entirely unprepared and caused them massive losses. Example: the first to get overrun, the VSRF garrison of Neskuchne, counted 200: 60 were confirmed killed, 2-3 captured, the rest run away. It was similar in Blahodatne, Stoozheve, Makarivka, Staromayorske, and Urozhane. Eventually, the 60th Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB) and the 366th Naval Infantry Brigade were mauled and fell apart. As they began fleeing down the road running west of the Mokri Yaly, got ambushed at multiple points, suffering yet additional losses.
Something similar happened when the Russians brought in their ‘operational reserve’ in form of the 127th MRD, from the 3rd defence line up to the Staromlynivka area and ordered it into a counterattack, on 10 June. This move was detected by ZSU on time and the division heavily shelled already while preparing this attack in the Staromlynivka area, suffering numerous losses in tanks and guns.
Nevertheless, the Russians counterattacked. One prong went around Staromayorske to the north and attempted to recover Storozheve. There it run into the infantry of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence and was ambushed, suffering numerous losses. Another went east of the river and tried to hit the ZSU in Urozhaine from the east, but run into ambushes and mines and suffered heavy losses. Moreover, Ukrainians (apparently. 35th Naval Infantry and the 3rd Mechanised) then liberated Novodonetske and hit that Russian counterattack into its eastern flank… Finally, apparently on 11 June, the 127th counterattacked on Makarivka, and suffered heavy losses again, enabling Ukrainians to relaunch their advance and reach Staormlynivka, yesterday in the morning: ever since, there is bitter fighting inside this village (or small town, if you like).
Moreover, Ukrainians have hit the HQ of the 35th CAA, killing its Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Sergey Goryachev (said to have been a skilled commander).
Note: no matter if in the Bakhmut or in the Velyka Novosilka area, it’s interesting to watch the ZSU infantry fairing so much better than its armour, by night and by day, in static- or in manoeuvre warfare (indeed: easily outmatching whatever the Russians throw its way), as so often in this war…
Vuhledar…there are lots of reports indicating bitter fighting south-east of the town, approximately between Blahodatne and Volnovakha. Apparently, ZSU might have reached the Blahodatne area, back on 7-8 June, before the VSRF launched a counterattack from the east (with reserves re-deployed from the Donetsk area). The counterattack might have been partially successful in slowing down Ukrainian advance, but was then stopped and the troops in question re-deployed into defence positions south of Volnovakha. That, however, is about all I know regarding what’s going on there.
- horace
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A week, give or take a few days, after the counter offensive was declared and not much in the way of news either from our resident war watches on k440 or the international media. A few km liberated, the odd village here and there but nothing substantial.
Has the offensive failed?
Has the offensive failed?
k440, something to do when you're pissed.
horace, you have the brains, I think, to realise that if we haven't heard anything, it's going well for Russia.
Western media has shown an unquestioning partisanship I haven't seen in many, many years, the slightest thing that can be spun is spun, fantasy becomes reality, anybody who questions the Ukraine narrative is cancelled.
The level of denial is just unbelievable, it reminds me of the Nazi denials when Russian and American forces were nearing Berlin.
Who benefits from this shameful bias in news? The usual suspects.
Western media has shown an unquestioning partisanship I haven't seen in many, many years, the slightest thing that can be spun is spun, fantasy becomes reality, anybody who questions the Ukraine narrative is cancelled.
The level of denial is just unbelievable, it reminds me of the Nazi denials when Russian and American forces were nearing Berlin.
Who benefits from this shameful bias in news? The usual suspects.
'The general population doesn't know what's happening, and it doesn't even know that it doesn't know.'
Noam Chomsky
Noam Chomsky
- Prahok
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Far too early to make any assessments as the Ukrainians have yet to commit the bulk of their prepared units (even those engaging are only using elements) and the Russians have yet to fall back to their secondary defensive positions, which are heavily fortified.horace wrote: ↑Sun Jun 18, 2023 12:06 pmA week, give or take a few days, after the counter offensive was declared and not much in the way of news either from our resident war watches on k440 or the international media. A few km liberated, the odd village here and there but nothing substantial.
Has the offensive failed?
The Russians brought addition attack helicopters which is aiding their defense.
Anyone declaring the Ukrainian counter offensive a success or failure at this juncture is just having a guess.
I’ll start with a quick review of latest developments on the battlefield. Some analysis of this is then going to explain the rest of what’s coming to my mind, too…
MISSILE WAR
Early on 16 June (and in the aftermath of another bestial attack on civilians in Dnipro), the Russians released six Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ missiles upon Kyiv. Some say: not from MiG-31s. If so, then they were fired from the ground, in ballistic mode? No idea. One way or the other, the PSU claimed all six as shot down. As usually, debris caused quite some material damage and wounded at least three. Around the same time, the Russians used a stream of Shaheds to target several PSU radars in the Dnipro area, and then ‘exploited the resulting gap’ in the Ukrainian radar network to target Kyiv with six Kalibre cruise missiles, too. All of these were claimed as shot down by Ukrainians, nevertheless.
BATTLE OF DONBAS
Kupyansk-Svatove area… ‘quiet’
Siversk… the Russians are still running small-scale attacks in the Bilohorivka area (the one on the Siversky Donets). Still without success.
Bakhmut… the ZSU is still grinding through the outskirts of Berkhivka and Yahidne in the north-west, and in direction of Klishchivka in the south-west….
Lots of minor attacks and counterattacks took part on many other sectors of the frontline in the east…
SOUTHERN UKRAINE
In the west, the ZSU secured Lobkove, the last night, and then – according to Russian sources – not only repelled multiple counterattacks, but advanced into western Pyatikhatki.
South of Orikhiv, the ZSU ploughed a long path through the Russian minefields all the way to Novodanylivka and then half way to Robotyne.
There’s a similar battle for Novopokrovka, south-east of Orikhiv – and that for some 5-6 days already: see, a long path through the Russian minefields, followed by infantry assault on Russian positions inside that village…
South of Velyka Novoselivka, while repelling multiple Russian counterattacks on Marikivka, Ukrainians started grinding in direction of Urozhanie again. Might even have reached its eastern outskirts. Further east, the situation in Novodonetske remains unclear, but it seems the ZSU is attacking in direction of Kermenchyk…
Now pay attention: remember what I’ve posted about the combination of Russian Orlan UAVs and MSTA-S self-propelled howitzers, again and again, in spring and summer last year? Remember what I said about Orlans being de facto non-operational in cold weather and rain? Well, the spring is here and, even though the weather is cloudy, with some showers, the last 2-3 days, it’s ‘good enough’. Therefore, ‘Orlans are back’. Indeed, it turns out that, except for mines, the major new problem for the ZSU is not the combination ‘Orlans + MSTAs’, but the combination of Orlan and Zala reconnaissance UAVs, with Lancet LPGMs, and Ka-52 attack helicopters.
Essentially, Orlans and Zalas are used to scout positions of the Ukrainian artillery, air defences, and electronic warfare assets, and these are then targeted by large waves of Lancets, followed by Ka-52s (and, occassionally, Mi-28s).
Ka-52 ‘in its element’: low over - and often: between - the trees…
A view at a LMUR PGM, milliseconds after being released by a Mi-28 attack helicopter.
Like already the last year, the ZSU not only still has no solution for Orlans, but now even less so has a working solution for Lancets. Sure, pick-up-mounted KPT machine guns are frequently effective against them, but they are too few, and too scattered: there’s no way the ZSU can buy enough of these. And the ZSU has not enough electronic warfare systems to block them, ‘big style’. Indeed, in regards of electronic warfare, the situation is, de-facto, ‘hopeless’.
And so, because of Lancets, ZSU artillery has to move very frequently (if not, then it gets hit by Lancets). And when it’s moving, it can’t shot. And thus it often happens that units advancing into Russian positions are not receiving necessary (and promised) artillery support.
….and, again: there’s no solution in sight, because even Ukrainian air defences (like this P-18 radar) and electronic warfare systems (like this rare Bukovel) are under severe pressure of the Orlan+Zala+Lancet+Ka-52 combination.
Venture into online-psychoanalysis and tell me I’m ‘having a depressive day’, if you like, but, hand on heart: it’s ‘absurd’, sure, however, right now, and although having no high-tech industry in its back, the VSRF is actually fighting this war - and surviving - thanks to more modern means than the ZSU.
Ukrainian P-18 radar under attack of a Lancet, some 3-4 days ago. The LPGM detonated on hitting the logs, and its blast went underneath the truck carrying the radar, but: be sure: this was no pleasant experience for the crew…
....at least the ZSU seems to have changed the tactics of its artillery: instead of deploying this in 'phases', like early during this offensive (when it was like '2 days shelling of this kind of targets, then 2 days of shelling that kind of targets'), now the artillery is foremost deployed in 'close support mode'. The job of targeting Russians deeper behind the frontline is now run by M142s and M270s with help of GLMRS.
Bottom line: even if actually superior in firepower and precision of its artillery vis-a-vis the Russian artillery, the ZSU cannot fully exploit this superiority, because it lacks effective air defences. These are still busy protecting Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv….
….which is prompting me into yet more analysis. Yesterday, I’ve discussed the way I understand the Russian strategy of the last few months. Obviously – and this was meanwhile confirmed by Pudding, in one of his latest public appearances – this is aiming to buy time: buy time to mobilise yet more troops necessary to replace losses, to construct additional fortifications, and to ‘outsit’ its enemies in this war, until they are fed up of fighting and losses, and/or supporting Ukraine… and that principally through the defence by the means of localised counterattacks…
In this regards it was interesting to monitor today, how, ‘hours after’ the release of my analysis, assessments appeared in the social media pointing out the ZSU is ‘actually’ trying to ‘provoke’ exactly this behaviour by the VSRF: i.e. trying to drag its big units out of their fortified ‘defence lines’ into the open.
Hand on heart: that’s perfectly possible. At least it wouldn’t be anything new if strategists are trying to outsmart each other. However, I’m not ‘buying’ that – and I think there are plenty of reasons why.
For the start - and feel free to correct me: I’ll feel better if I’m wrong, but - I do not see any kind of serious, long-term strategy in what is the government in Kyiv doing. Even less so in what are all of its ‘allies’ in the West doing. Sure, the official aim remains to liberate every square centimetre of Ukrainian soil (and this is, apparently, supported by the majority of Ukrainian population still in the country). And there will be no negotiations before the Russians withdraw. And there are solemn promises at least from Washington, Berlin, and London, that the support is going to go on as long as it takes….which in these three cases actually means: 1000% sure - until the next elections…
That much has been stated often enough, and is perfectly clear. However, how is that war aim going to be achieved? By reluctance, hesitation, keeping the low profile?
Of course, one can say that’s ‘secret’, but I do not have impression that anybody ‘there’ really knows how to do this.
….at least I cannot imagine this can be done by (belated) deliveries of obsolete weaponry, the stocks of which are certain to run out by the end of this year…
Things are getting even more worrisome considering nobody in the West seems to have a trace of an idea – whether about strategy or about modern military technology. Our glorious politicians are ‘CEOs on a hunt for short-term profits’: they do not know how to lead, only how to administer. They’re experts in laying low, and in restrained reactions to Pudding. Neither they nor their advisors have own ideas, tough, no solutions, and thus no trace of clue about autonomous operations: they do not even think about outthinking Pudding. They’re too scared by his blackmails to do so. If that’s not enough, they can’t see any further than tips of their noses: like when the former CEO of the Boeing cut short the testing of the Boeing 737Max, and the jets then started crashing, killing hundreds. But hey: before being removed, he cashed millions, and then even more so for being fired….
Unsurprisingly, NATO is still no ‘two-’, but ‘five steps’ behind: still in the process of shipping largely obsolete weapons and ammo it should’ve shipped 8-9-10 months back; and still not thinking about re-equipping the ZSU with latest in its technologies – and then in large numbers. That would require thinking beyond the tips of noses, though: considering the inability of places like the Pentagon and NATO HQ in Brussels to reform, and that for decades already, this is little surprising. Therefore, both are dominated by people used to squandering billions to buy obsolete technologies, while too incompetent but to at least understand latest in military sciences.
(….no surprise I’m getting requests from people working ‘there’, to sign my books with ‘For People in need of fresh Air’ and ‘For People with broomstick up their Backside’…)
So, how should one expect Washington, the Pentagon, Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, Amsterdam etc. to quickly adapt and change anything at all? To at least understand, already some 8-10 months ago, that the ZSU and the PSU can’t run counteroffensives if they haven’t got even enough air defence systems for protection of major urban centres and industrial facilities, not to talk about enough for protection of ZSU’s frontlines…?
….all of which is even more absurd considering such Ukrainian needs were crystal clear already as of March the last year…
….which is bringing me back to the victim of the Russian aggression, war of extermination and mass attrocities: I still wonder who is controlling whom in Kyiv. Or, shall I say: I’m not sure the government has perfect control over different of its bodies – especially intel services?
By side that even 15 months since the Russian walkover in Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhya, Kyiv still can’t clearly point with finger at the culprits…But, and for example: the last two weeks the ZSU is attacking through 10-15km deep Russian minefields, sown along the frontline, but – obviously – without a clear picture about the extension of the minefields in question, or about Russian positions constructed to protect these (then, the mass of Russian generals might be professional military incompetents, and drunkards, but even they know: minefields are useless if not well protected). The ZSU simply hasn’t got the necessary intel, although this should’ve been available already months ago. Unsurprisingly, the situation is thus only getting poorer when the Russians deploy additional mines with help of their Zemlodeliye ISDMs.
Of course, one can be sure ZSU did try to do its part of the job by running ‘field reconnaissance’: by using the last winter to send patrols to scout through the minefields and search for Russian positions. But, these can’t really go much deeper than 5-10km behind the Russian lines. Anything beyond that point is hopeless. Even more so considering the fact that more than half the ZSU’s special forces – units actually established, equipped and trained to do that part of the job - have spent the last winter deployed as line infantry in the defence of Bakhmut…
Ok then… but, shouldn’t it be the job of the GUR MO to find out? Was it really ‘impossible’ for this service to, with help of NATO reconnaissance tools, systematically track the work of VSRF’s engineers, the last 6-7 months – and that while single ‘OSINT’-buffs in the social media proved capable of tracking their work on construction of fortifications….?
….once again, as soon as I start thinking about the GUR MO, conclusion is unavoidable that, ‘something is rather smelly there’.
….and it’s not the only such case. Here’s another example: Ukrainian long-range UAVs are still regularly deployed to attack refineries 100-200km deep inside Russia. Yes, it’s ‘sexy’ when there are videos shown ‘attacks on Russia’. But, what’s the point of such attacks? Is anybody at least measuring their effects? Because, So far, there’re none to be seen. At least no indications the VSRF is ‘short on fuel’. Correspondingly, the UAVs in question are squandered for non-military purposes – while urgently needed for undisputable military purposes.
How ‘sound’, isn’t it…?
Because, at the same time, and as obvious from the following sat photo that is making circles in the social media since a few days, some of the most effective Russian weapons – Ka-52s attack helicopters – are nicely bunched together on such an exposed site like Berdyansk airport, mere…. lets say, 110km from nearest ZSU positions. Was the place hit by now? AFAIK, nope. Only the local port and different of storage facilities there.
That much about ‘strategy’ and thus about ‘shaping operations’. Please, be so kind, do not ask me about these any more. There’s no clear strategy to see, and thus there are no ‘shaping operations’: the ZSU has to run ‘armed reconnaissance’ while actually in the process of assaulting - just to find a way to and through the foremost Russian positions…
To make sure: I do not expect ‘Zelensky’ to create wonders. He’s got no clue about strategy or modern military technology, and can’t do better but what he is advised to say. And I gave up the hope about Western ‘presidents’ and ‘chancelors’, ages ago: they’re entirely useless. But, what’s with Zelensky’s advisors? What’s with generals and other ‘Experten’? All too busy with ‘give us F-16s’-affairs?
As much as they’re all certainly very patriotic, sorry: ‘the fish always starts smelling from the head’, as we say in Austria. Thus, ‘somebody’ there is in need of urgent re-thinking and re-organisation, so Ukraine can - finally - get what it actually needs. And, right now (which is already ‘months late’) - that’s no ‘sexy fighter-bombers’…
-Tom Cooper
MISSILE WAR
Early on 16 June (and in the aftermath of another bestial attack on civilians in Dnipro), the Russians released six Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ missiles upon Kyiv. Some say: not from MiG-31s. If so, then they were fired from the ground, in ballistic mode? No idea. One way or the other, the PSU claimed all six as shot down. As usually, debris caused quite some material damage and wounded at least three. Around the same time, the Russians used a stream of Shaheds to target several PSU radars in the Dnipro area, and then ‘exploited the resulting gap’ in the Ukrainian radar network to target Kyiv with six Kalibre cruise missiles, too. All of these were claimed as shot down by Ukrainians, nevertheless.
BATTLE OF DONBAS
Kupyansk-Svatove area… ‘quiet’
Siversk… the Russians are still running small-scale attacks in the Bilohorivka area (the one on the Siversky Donets). Still without success.
Bakhmut… the ZSU is still grinding through the outskirts of Berkhivka and Yahidne in the north-west, and in direction of Klishchivka in the south-west….
Lots of minor attacks and counterattacks took part on many other sectors of the frontline in the east…
SOUTHERN UKRAINE
In the west, the ZSU secured Lobkove, the last night, and then – according to Russian sources – not only repelled multiple counterattacks, but advanced into western Pyatikhatki.
South of Orikhiv, the ZSU ploughed a long path through the Russian minefields all the way to Novodanylivka and then half way to Robotyne.
There’s a similar battle for Novopokrovka, south-east of Orikhiv – and that for some 5-6 days already: see, a long path through the Russian minefields, followed by infantry assault on Russian positions inside that village…
South of Velyka Novoselivka, while repelling multiple Russian counterattacks on Marikivka, Ukrainians started grinding in direction of Urozhanie again. Might even have reached its eastern outskirts. Further east, the situation in Novodonetske remains unclear, but it seems the ZSU is attacking in direction of Kermenchyk…
Now pay attention: remember what I’ve posted about the combination of Russian Orlan UAVs and MSTA-S self-propelled howitzers, again and again, in spring and summer last year? Remember what I said about Orlans being de facto non-operational in cold weather and rain? Well, the spring is here and, even though the weather is cloudy, with some showers, the last 2-3 days, it’s ‘good enough’. Therefore, ‘Orlans are back’. Indeed, it turns out that, except for mines, the major new problem for the ZSU is not the combination ‘Orlans + MSTAs’, but the combination of Orlan and Zala reconnaissance UAVs, with Lancet LPGMs, and Ka-52 attack helicopters.
Essentially, Orlans and Zalas are used to scout positions of the Ukrainian artillery, air defences, and electronic warfare assets, and these are then targeted by large waves of Lancets, followed by Ka-52s (and, occassionally, Mi-28s).
Ka-52 ‘in its element’: low over - and often: between - the trees…
A view at a LMUR PGM, milliseconds after being released by a Mi-28 attack helicopter.
Like already the last year, the ZSU not only still has no solution for Orlans, but now even less so has a working solution for Lancets. Sure, pick-up-mounted KPT machine guns are frequently effective against them, but they are too few, and too scattered: there’s no way the ZSU can buy enough of these. And the ZSU has not enough electronic warfare systems to block them, ‘big style’. Indeed, in regards of electronic warfare, the situation is, de-facto, ‘hopeless’.
And so, because of Lancets, ZSU artillery has to move very frequently (if not, then it gets hit by Lancets). And when it’s moving, it can’t shot. And thus it often happens that units advancing into Russian positions are not receiving necessary (and promised) artillery support.
….and, again: there’s no solution in sight, because even Ukrainian air defences (like this P-18 radar) and electronic warfare systems (like this rare Bukovel) are under severe pressure of the Orlan+Zala+Lancet+Ka-52 combination.
Venture into online-psychoanalysis and tell me I’m ‘having a depressive day’, if you like, but, hand on heart: it’s ‘absurd’, sure, however, right now, and although having no high-tech industry in its back, the VSRF is actually fighting this war - and surviving - thanks to more modern means than the ZSU.
Ukrainian P-18 radar under attack of a Lancet, some 3-4 days ago. The LPGM detonated on hitting the logs, and its blast went underneath the truck carrying the radar, but: be sure: this was no pleasant experience for the crew…
....at least the ZSU seems to have changed the tactics of its artillery: instead of deploying this in 'phases', like early during this offensive (when it was like '2 days shelling of this kind of targets, then 2 days of shelling that kind of targets'), now the artillery is foremost deployed in 'close support mode'. The job of targeting Russians deeper behind the frontline is now run by M142s and M270s with help of GLMRS.
Bottom line: even if actually superior in firepower and precision of its artillery vis-a-vis the Russian artillery, the ZSU cannot fully exploit this superiority, because it lacks effective air defences. These are still busy protecting Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv….
….which is prompting me into yet more analysis. Yesterday, I’ve discussed the way I understand the Russian strategy of the last few months. Obviously – and this was meanwhile confirmed by Pudding, in one of his latest public appearances – this is aiming to buy time: buy time to mobilise yet more troops necessary to replace losses, to construct additional fortifications, and to ‘outsit’ its enemies in this war, until they are fed up of fighting and losses, and/or supporting Ukraine… and that principally through the defence by the means of localised counterattacks…
In this regards it was interesting to monitor today, how, ‘hours after’ the release of my analysis, assessments appeared in the social media pointing out the ZSU is ‘actually’ trying to ‘provoke’ exactly this behaviour by the VSRF: i.e. trying to drag its big units out of their fortified ‘defence lines’ into the open.
Hand on heart: that’s perfectly possible. At least it wouldn’t be anything new if strategists are trying to outsmart each other. However, I’m not ‘buying’ that – and I think there are plenty of reasons why.
For the start - and feel free to correct me: I’ll feel better if I’m wrong, but - I do not see any kind of serious, long-term strategy in what is the government in Kyiv doing. Even less so in what are all of its ‘allies’ in the West doing. Sure, the official aim remains to liberate every square centimetre of Ukrainian soil (and this is, apparently, supported by the majority of Ukrainian population still in the country). And there will be no negotiations before the Russians withdraw. And there are solemn promises at least from Washington, Berlin, and London, that the support is going to go on as long as it takes….which in these three cases actually means: 1000% sure - until the next elections…
That much has been stated often enough, and is perfectly clear. However, how is that war aim going to be achieved? By reluctance, hesitation, keeping the low profile?
Of course, one can say that’s ‘secret’, but I do not have impression that anybody ‘there’ really knows how to do this.
….at least I cannot imagine this can be done by (belated) deliveries of obsolete weaponry, the stocks of which are certain to run out by the end of this year…
Things are getting even more worrisome considering nobody in the West seems to have a trace of an idea – whether about strategy or about modern military technology. Our glorious politicians are ‘CEOs on a hunt for short-term profits’: they do not know how to lead, only how to administer. They’re experts in laying low, and in restrained reactions to Pudding. Neither they nor their advisors have own ideas, tough, no solutions, and thus no trace of clue about autonomous operations: they do not even think about outthinking Pudding. They’re too scared by his blackmails to do so. If that’s not enough, they can’t see any further than tips of their noses: like when the former CEO of the Boeing cut short the testing of the Boeing 737Max, and the jets then started crashing, killing hundreds. But hey: before being removed, he cashed millions, and then even more so for being fired….
Unsurprisingly, NATO is still no ‘two-’, but ‘five steps’ behind: still in the process of shipping largely obsolete weapons and ammo it should’ve shipped 8-9-10 months back; and still not thinking about re-equipping the ZSU with latest in its technologies – and then in large numbers. That would require thinking beyond the tips of noses, though: considering the inability of places like the Pentagon and NATO HQ in Brussels to reform, and that for decades already, this is little surprising. Therefore, both are dominated by people used to squandering billions to buy obsolete technologies, while too incompetent but to at least understand latest in military sciences.
(….no surprise I’m getting requests from people working ‘there’, to sign my books with ‘For People in need of fresh Air’ and ‘For People with broomstick up their Backside’…)
So, how should one expect Washington, the Pentagon, Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, Amsterdam etc. to quickly adapt and change anything at all? To at least understand, already some 8-10 months ago, that the ZSU and the PSU can’t run counteroffensives if they haven’t got even enough air defence systems for protection of major urban centres and industrial facilities, not to talk about enough for protection of ZSU’s frontlines…?
….all of which is even more absurd considering such Ukrainian needs were crystal clear already as of March the last year…
….which is bringing me back to the victim of the Russian aggression, war of extermination and mass attrocities: I still wonder who is controlling whom in Kyiv. Or, shall I say: I’m not sure the government has perfect control over different of its bodies – especially intel services?
By side that even 15 months since the Russian walkover in Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhya, Kyiv still can’t clearly point with finger at the culprits…But, and for example: the last two weeks the ZSU is attacking through 10-15km deep Russian minefields, sown along the frontline, but – obviously – without a clear picture about the extension of the minefields in question, or about Russian positions constructed to protect these (then, the mass of Russian generals might be professional military incompetents, and drunkards, but even they know: minefields are useless if not well protected). The ZSU simply hasn’t got the necessary intel, although this should’ve been available already months ago. Unsurprisingly, the situation is thus only getting poorer when the Russians deploy additional mines with help of their Zemlodeliye ISDMs.
Of course, one can be sure ZSU did try to do its part of the job by running ‘field reconnaissance’: by using the last winter to send patrols to scout through the minefields and search for Russian positions. But, these can’t really go much deeper than 5-10km behind the Russian lines. Anything beyond that point is hopeless. Even more so considering the fact that more than half the ZSU’s special forces – units actually established, equipped and trained to do that part of the job - have spent the last winter deployed as line infantry in the defence of Bakhmut…
Ok then… but, shouldn’t it be the job of the GUR MO to find out? Was it really ‘impossible’ for this service to, with help of NATO reconnaissance tools, systematically track the work of VSRF’s engineers, the last 6-7 months – and that while single ‘OSINT’-buffs in the social media proved capable of tracking their work on construction of fortifications….?
….once again, as soon as I start thinking about the GUR MO, conclusion is unavoidable that, ‘something is rather smelly there’.
….and it’s not the only such case. Here’s another example: Ukrainian long-range UAVs are still regularly deployed to attack refineries 100-200km deep inside Russia. Yes, it’s ‘sexy’ when there are videos shown ‘attacks on Russia’. But, what’s the point of such attacks? Is anybody at least measuring their effects? Because, So far, there’re none to be seen. At least no indications the VSRF is ‘short on fuel’. Correspondingly, the UAVs in question are squandered for non-military purposes – while urgently needed for undisputable military purposes.
How ‘sound’, isn’t it…?
Because, at the same time, and as obvious from the following sat photo that is making circles in the social media since a few days, some of the most effective Russian weapons – Ka-52s attack helicopters – are nicely bunched together on such an exposed site like Berdyansk airport, mere…. lets say, 110km from nearest ZSU positions. Was the place hit by now? AFAIK, nope. Only the local port and different of storage facilities there.
That much about ‘strategy’ and thus about ‘shaping operations’. Please, be so kind, do not ask me about these any more. There’s no clear strategy to see, and thus there are no ‘shaping operations’: the ZSU has to run ‘armed reconnaissance’ while actually in the process of assaulting - just to find a way to and through the foremost Russian positions…
To make sure: I do not expect ‘Zelensky’ to create wonders. He’s got no clue about strategy or modern military technology, and can’t do better but what he is advised to say. And I gave up the hope about Western ‘presidents’ and ‘chancelors’, ages ago: they’re entirely useless. But, what’s with Zelensky’s advisors? What’s with generals and other ‘Experten’? All too busy with ‘give us F-16s’-affairs?
As much as they’re all certainly very patriotic, sorry: ‘the fish always starts smelling from the head’, as we say in Austria. Thus, ‘somebody’ there is in need of urgent re-thinking and re-organisation, so Ukraine can - finally - get what it actually needs. And, right now (which is already ‘months late’) - that’s no ‘sexy fighter-bombers’…
-Tom Cooper
Time for an update on developments over the last few days.
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
On 18 June, a major VSRF ammo dump outside Rykove, in southern Kherson, decided to commit a suicide through spontaneous detonation. Probably because it saw a Storm Shadow. The explosion was so massive that not only the warehouses and the railway nearby, but most likely much of Rykove is completely demolished. ‘Secondaries’ (detonations caused by the initial blow), went on for something like six hours. RUMINT has it, even as of the following morning, the Russians were still busy searching for pieces of some 52 killed and a similar number of wounded – between their military personnel (curiously, haven’t heard the Russians complaining about any kind of civilian casualties, although I guess there must’ve been some….), but I’m already sad to hear that some of guards protecting this facility were Kadyrovites…
Earlier, Ukraine also destroyed two rail bridges on the railway line from the Crimea up to Rykove and Melitopol (i.e. ‘feeding’ this and few other depots). Indeed, this strike was the latest in an entire series: previously, Ukrainians also hit the Russian warehouses in Azurnoe, Skadovsk, Genichesk, and few other places (a nice little map with all of such attacks can be found here), while on the morning of 20 June, something blew up in Korsunka, in the Kakhovka District.
This is indicating that the PSU has switched its attention: away from different Russian headquarters (savaged over the last two weeks), and over to the Russian supply depots. This is likely to have taken away about a week-worth of VSRF’s supply of artillery shells and, considering problems caused by strikes on the railway, it might be slightly more, too – and it’s going to take even longer for the Russians to scratch the necessary ammo and then create and re-fill new depots, which now have to be build-up even further away from the frontline….
On the Russian side…
….and except for heavily shelling and rocketing the Sumy Oblast, the Nikopol area, and Kherson (where numerous civilians were murdered while involved in different evacuation and rescue operations, the last few days) – and that every single day…
The VSRF seems to have exhausted its stocks of ballistic- and cruise missiles during the failed ‘Blitz’ on Kyiv, in May. Over the last two weeks, it’s only sporadically trying to strike with small numbers of cruise missiles. More often with Shahed LPGMs. Ballistic missiles are deployed only something like ‘once a week’.
Through 17 and 18 June, Ukrainians reported ‘only’ four Shaheds (and one Lancet) as shot down.
Around 02.39hrs on 19 June, the VKS fired several S-300 missiles in ballistic mode at the Zaporizhzhya Oblast, and then followed up with four Kalibr cruise missiles and four Shahed LPGMs. All of the latter eight were claimed as shot down by Ukrainians.
During the night from 19 to 20 June, another 32 out of 35 detected Shaheds were shot down. Most of these (about 20) in the Kyiv area. Three came through and hit ‘critical infrastructure facility’ in Lviv. Simultaneously, a ‘large-scale airstrike’ was reported from the Zapoizhzhya (city) area, but next to no details released except for ‘utilities and private property damaged’. Apparently, there were no casualtiey.
BTW, according to the US Defense News, the mass of Shaheds shot down between September 2022 and January 2023 – no less than 540 – were all felled by German-made Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns:
As mentioned in my earlier reports, the last two weeks the Russians were regularly reacting to Ukrainian attacks by their Kamov Ka-52 (and, less often: Mi-28) attack helicopters. Early on, these were primarily deploying LMUR PGMs:
LMURs have a max engagement range of about 14,000m, a hefty punch, and seem to have scored a number of hits on Ukrainian vehicles over the first two weeks of this month. Meanwhile, seems the Russians have depleted stocks of such weapons (it’s definitely so that the number of related videos published on Telegram went down), and thus they returned to the use of shorter-ranged (10,000m) Vikhr. This in turn brought them within range of Ukrainian air defences, and thus it was interesting to monitor related ZSU claims:
- 14 June: 1 Ka-52 claimed as shot down over southern Zaporizhzhya (no other details);
- 17 June: 2 Ka-52s claimed as shot down between 22.00 and 23.00hrs in the evening;
- 18 June: 1 Ka-52 claimed as shot down (time and place not mentioned) early in the morning, 1 claimed in the afternoon.
- 19 June: 1 Ka-52 claimed as shot down ‘on the evening, around 23.00hrs’.
As far as I can say, none of this is confirmed, yet: at most, the Russians released a video shown one of Ka-52s jettisoning drop tanks and missing most of its fin… That said, it might be that some of Ukrainian claims are related to the deployment of the SAMP-T air defence system (jointly developed by France and Italy), meanwhile confirmed as ‘in Ukraine’ by official Paris. The first battalion arrived together with 700 Aster-30 missiles.
BTW, when one counts that the VKS received about 150 Ka-52s so far, then deducts the number of those visually confirmed as shot down (some 47), plus the number of non-operational examples visible on the left side of the photo here… turns out the total Russian fleet is meanwhile down to about 40-50.
Elsewhere, on 20 June, the Russians claimed a PSU Mi-24 as shot down by their interceptors in the Kramatorsk area, and a Mi-8 by ground based air defences in the Orikhiv area. No evidence has been provided for this, but along reports from the GenStab-U, the number of combat sorties flown by the PSU is meanwhile down to between 15 and 20 a day. That’s down ‘from more than 20 a day’, earlier this month, which is likely to indicate some attrition.
BATTLE FOR DONBAS
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina…On 19 June, official Kyiv reported that the VSRF launched an offensive in the north-western Luhansk:
• one prong from the Pokrovske area in direction of Kupyansk, and
• another from Kremina in direction of Torske and Lyman.
‘Heavy shelling’, ‘hot battles’, and ‘difficult situation’ were reported - mostly by Ukrainians. The heaviest attacks seem to be run by the 76th VDV Division in the south, in direction of Yampolivka and Zarichne. The ZSU is defending with the 23rd Rifle, 111th and 126th TD Brigades there, apparently with some support of the 95th Assault. Further south, the BARS-12, -16, and -20 are attacking through the forest along the Siversky Donets. The ZSU has the 63rd and 67th Mechanised there.
Essentially, this is an interesting attempt to force Ukrainians to lessen their pressure upon southern Zaporizhzhya and south-western Donetsk, and re-deploy some of their reserves to the north. That itch in my small toe says: a good sign.
The Russians have a massive concentration of forces deployed in ther rear of the Svatove-Kremina-Rubizhne-Lysychansk sector. They’ve had the option of re-deploying these to southern Ukraine, or ‘doing something’ with them where they are. Have opted for the latter. How good is that going to work: no idea. Can only say that even the VDV units are limited to operations by daylight, and lacking communications, training, and equipment to outmatch the ZSU on 1 for 1 basis. For example: lately, Ukrainians are monitoring a growing number of Russian armoured vehicles abandoned because they were in much too poor technical condition: were pulled out of mothballs and sent to the frontlines without necessary overhauls (arguably, the same is valid for up to a third of what NATO is sending to Ukraine….but, Ukrainians do not deploy broken Western stuff in combat without necessary checks and maintenance).
Bakhmut…. The 57th Motorised seems to have been inside Berkhivka, on 17-18 June, but was then hit by a severe Russian counterattack from three sides. This forced it back to south-western outskirts. South of Bakhmut, the 3rd Assault is still grinding in direction of Klishchivka…
Avdiivka…the ZSU is pushing into the area north of the town, approx. two kilometres north-east of Brevno and south of Krasnohorivka, and seems to have made some advances in direction of Novoselivka, back on 18 June.
Mariinka… the Russians are running local attacks into Krasnohorivka (north of Marinka), into Mariinka, and south of it, but all of that is ‘going nowhere’…
SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA (& SOUTH-WESTERN DONETSK)
Vasylivka (‘disclaimer’: that’s the eastern side of what used to be the ‘Kakhovka Sea’ until the Russian scum blew up the Kakhovka Dam, which is something half the ‘West’ still ‘cannot officially confirm’….usually because ‘it’s complex’….)…
On 16 June, the ZSU secured the ruins of the village of Lobkove. On 17 June, the ZSU attacked Pyalykhatky from two sides, causing panic between the Russians: indeed, the latter claimed that ‘Ukrainians wearing uniforms of the VSRF’ penetrated the ‘4th Military Base’ (VSRF: an unit usually stationed in South Ossetia), west of Luhove (that’s some 10km south of Kamianske and 10km south-west of Lobkove), ‘but’, that they ‘burned’ all the ‘militants’ – until it turned out these were their own troops. Then they fell silent.
Through 18 June, the Russians counterattacked, claiming massive losses to the Ukrainians. Think, they did cause lots of troubles, and destroyed some 7-8 armoured vehicles. However, Ukrainians brought in reinforcements, and attacked again, destroying a battalion of 300 of either the 4th Military Base or the Storm Ossetia Battalion, including its commander (less than 20 Russians came away). Some claim the actual designation of the unit was the ‘80th Brigade’, but I’m not sure about that.
On 19 June, the 128th Mountain Assault attacked Zherebianky from two sides (the place is held by the BARS-32) Shortly later, the VSRF launched a counterattack on Pyalykhatky (or rushed ‘reinforcements’ to the place because it didn’t know it was lost?): Ukrainians fell back to their starting positions and then threw the Russians back with losses in armour, while launching another attack from Pyalykhatky into a small forest on a low hill south-east of the place. Ironically, Russian contacts have confirmed the attack and the presence of the 128th Mountain Assault, nothing else, but: they’re not making jokes about this ZSU unit any more (the 128th is home-based in Melitupol and early during the war fought a terrific – but also sad – withdrawal battle from that town via Tokmak and Polohy to Hulyapole. because of this, the Russians regularly mocked it were publishing fantastic claims about its losses).
As of 20 June, the 128th was back to attacking into Zherebianky…and I wonder: is this going to prompt the 49th or the 58th CAA (not sure which is responsible for this area) into another ‘operational-level’ counterattack or not? …or was this already smashed by the ZSU artillery, while still some 10km south of the frontline, as some claim?
Novodanylivka….since 16 June, the ZSU was making a slow, but good advance in southern direction. First ‘they’ brought in ‘something’ that started suppressing the effects of the Russian electronic warfare. Apparently, this did suppress Lancets, too, even if not the Ka-52s or the Russian ATGMs (these were still, and regularly, scoring ‘kills’, until two days ago). Then the cleaning of additional lines through the minefields was completed. Plus demining around own positions. Took a lots of artillery support, to knock out whatever the Russians tried to use to hinder this effort. In turn, that enabled better manoeuvrability of ZSU troops and a sustained influx of supplies (the same wouldn’t work with reinforcements because pumping too much troops into a too small zone would be too dangerous).
Anyway, by 17 June, the ZSU reached the northern outskirts of Robotyne, in the south, and began a systematic (even if slow) decimation of the Russian garrison there. On 18 or 19 June, the VSRF reacted with a major counterattack and claims to have pushed Ukrainians some two kilometres back. Ever since, it appears to be ‘silent’ there. Further east, Ukrainians have continued widening the penetration through the Russian minefields by cleaning additional lines about 5-6km south of Mala Tokmachka.
Hulaypole….still not sure about what’s going on between Marfopil and Pryyutne, because both sides are releasing next to no news, except denials of enemy claims, and 0+0=0… Gauging by reports about captured ZSU troops and MRAPsa from the southern fringes of this area, I guess Ukrainians are raiding around Prechystivka, though…
Staromaiorske/Staromayorske… (formerly ‘Velyka Novoselivka area’ or the ‘Vremivka Bulge’, but I think there’s no point in determining the area by a place that’s meanwhile well away from the frontline)…
On 15 June, the ZSU began a push along most of the Russian line between Urozhaine and Kermenchyk, which resulted in some of its units reaching approaches to Kluchove and….’slightly further south-east’ (yes, ‘again’).….which prompted Pudding’s PRBS-machinery into another wave of reports about ‘massive Ukrainian losses’. Actually, the move really took the Russians by surprise. Not only because they’re still busy trying to secure the link to their ‘besieged’ garrison of Rivnopil, and wasting troops while ‘counterattacking’ Makarivka, but because it seems this attack was also supported by ‘somebody’ bringing ‘something’ related to electronic warfare to this area, and – at least temporarily – suppressing the activity of the Orlan+Zola+Lancet combination (such ‘things’ tend to overheat easily, when worked at full power for longer periods of time).
Net result: as of 19 June, the ZSU was ‘well in between’ Zavitne Bezhannya, and Kermenchyk, and pushing south, but: also in western direction, over the Mokri Yaly River, again…
Overall: the ZSU is still grinding, cautiously and methodically, through the (actual) 1st defence line in the south. Such approach is necessary in order to limit own losses to the bare minimum, while securing maximum possible support for assaulting troops: is a major switch in ‘tactics’, in comparison to early this month. The Russians are still counterattacking at every opportunity: sure, their lower- and mid-ranking officers are simply awful, and the mass of their units along the 1st line meanwhile reduced by at least a third. However, their training, communications, and planning are better than expected, and there is no doubt that their top commanders are attempting to exploit every single opportunity to cause losses to the ZSU. With other words: they still know what are they doing and have their troops under control. However, they’re hopelessly outmatched in nocturnal combat, and this is what the ZSU is exploiting to the maximum, meanwhile - exactly like the superior defence capability of its units: it seems that nowadays, thanks to superior training and fire-support, a single Ukrainian battalion can outfight two or even more of Russian equivalents.
-Tom Cooper
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
On 18 June, a major VSRF ammo dump outside Rykove, in southern Kherson, decided to commit a suicide through spontaneous detonation. Probably because it saw a Storm Shadow. The explosion was so massive that not only the warehouses and the railway nearby, but most likely much of Rykove is completely demolished. ‘Secondaries’ (detonations caused by the initial blow), went on for something like six hours. RUMINT has it, even as of the following morning, the Russians were still busy searching for pieces of some 52 killed and a similar number of wounded – between their military personnel (curiously, haven’t heard the Russians complaining about any kind of civilian casualties, although I guess there must’ve been some….), but I’m already sad to hear that some of guards protecting this facility were Kadyrovites…
Earlier, Ukraine also destroyed two rail bridges on the railway line from the Crimea up to Rykove and Melitopol (i.e. ‘feeding’ this and few other depots). Indeed, this strike was the latest in an entire series: previously, Ukrainians also hit the Russian warehouses in Azurnoe, Skadovsk, Genichesk, and few other places (a nice little map with all of such attacks can be found here), while on the morning of 20 June, something blew up in Korsunka, in the Kakhovka District.
This is indicating that the PSU has switched its attention: away from different Russian headquarters (savaged over the last two weeks), and over to the Russian supply depots. This is likely to have taken away about a week-worth of VSRF’s supply of artillery shells and, considering problems caused by strikes on the railway, it might be slightly more, too – and it’s going to take even longer for the Russians to scratch the necessary ammo and then create and re-fill new depots, which now have to be build-up even further away from the frontline….
On the Russian side…
….and except for heavily shelling and rocketing the Sumy Oblast, the Nikopol area, and Kherson (where numerous civilians were murdered while involved in different evacuation and rescue operations, the last few days) – and that every single day…
The VSRF seems to have exhausted its stocks of ballistic- and cruise missiles during the failed ‘Blitz’ on Kyiv, in May. Over the last two weeks, it’s only sporadically trying to strike with small numbers of cruise missiles. More often with Shahed LPGMs. Ballistic missiles are deployed only something like ‘once a week’.
Through 17 and 18 June, Ukrainians reported ‘only’ four Shaheds (and one Lancet) as shot down.
Around 02.39hrs on 19 June, the VKS fired several S-300 missiles in ballistic mode at the Zaporizhzhya Oblast, and then followed up with four Kalibr cruise missiles and four Shahed LPGMs. All of the latter eight were claimed as shot down by Ukrainians.
During the night from 19 to 20 June, another 32 out of 35 detected Shaheds were shot down. Most of these (about 20) in the Kyiv area. Three came through and hit ‘critical infrastructure facility’ in Lviv. Simultaneously, a ‘large-scale airstrike’ was reported from the Zapoizhzhya (city) area, but next to no details released except for ‘utilities and private property damaged’. Apparently, there were no casualtiey.
BTW, according to the US Defense News, the mass of Shaheds shot down between September 2022 and January 2023 – no less than 540 – were all felled by German-made Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns:
As mentioned in my earlier reports, the last two weeks the Russians were regularly reacting to Ukrainian attacks by their Kamov Ka-52 (and, less often: Mi-28) attack helicopters. Early on, these were primarily deploying LMUR PGMs:
LMURs have a max engagement range of about 14,000m, a hefty punch, and seem to have scored a number of hits on Ukrainian vehicles over the first two weeks of this month. Meanwhile, seems the Russians have depleted stocks of such weapons (it’s definitely so that the number of related videos published on Telegram went down), and thus they returned to the use of shorter-ranged (10,000m) Vikhr. This in turn brought them within range of Ukrainian air defences, and thus it was interesting to monitor related ZSU claims:
- 14 June: 1 Ka-52 claimed as shot down over southern Zaporizhzhya (no other details);
- 17 June: 2 Ka-52s claimed as shot down between 22.00 and 23.00hrs in the evening;
- 18 June: 1 Ka-52 claimed as shot down (time and place not mentioned) early in the morning, 1 claimed in the afternoon.
- 19 June: 1 Ka-52 claimed as shot down ‘on the evening, around 23.00hrs’.
As far as I can say, none of this is confirmed, yet: at most, the Russians released a video shown one of Ka-52s jettisoning drop tanks and missing most of its fin… That said, it might be that some of Ukrainian claims are related to the deployment of the SAMP-T air defence system (jointly developed by France and Italy), meanwhile confirmed as ‘in Ukraine’ by official Paris. The first battalion arrived together with 700 Aster-30 missiles.
BTW, when one counts that the VKS received about 150 Ka-52s so far, then deducts the number of those visually confirmed as shot down (some 47), plus the number of non-operational examples visible on the left side of the photo here… turns out the total Russian fleet is meanwhile down to about 40-50.
Elsewhere, on 20 June, the Russians claimed a PSU Mi-24 as shot down by their interceptors in the Kramatorsk area, and a Mi-8 by ground based air defences in the Orikhiv area. No evidence has been provided for this, but along reports from the GenStab-U, the number of combat sorties flown by the PSU is meanwhile down to between 15 and 20 a day. That’s down ‘from more than 20 a day’, earlier this month, which is likely to indicate some attrition.
BATTLE FOR DONBAS
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina…On 19 June, official Kyiv reported that the VSRF launched an offensive in the north-western Luhansk:
• one prong from the Pokrovske area in direction of Kupyansk, and
• another from Kremina in direction of Torske and Lyman.
‘Heavy shelling’, ‘hot battles’, and ‘difficult situation’ were reported - mostly by Ukrainians. The heaviest attacks seem to be run by the 76th VDV Division in the south, in direction of Yampolivka and Zarichne. The ZSU is defending with the 23rd Rifle, 111th and 126th TD Brigades there, apparently with some support of the 95th Assault. Further south, the BARS-12, -16, and -20 are attacking through the forest along the Siversky Donets. The ZSU has the 63rd and 67th Mechanised there.
Essentially, this is an interesting attempt to force Ukrainians to lessen their pressure upon southern Zaporizhzhya and south-western Donetsk, and re-deploy some of their reserves to the north. That itch in my small toe says: a good sign.
The Russians have a massive concentration of forces deployed in ther rear of the Svatove-Kremina-Rubizhne-Lysychansk sector. They’ve had the option of re-deploying these to southern Ukraine, or ‘doing something’ with them where they are. Have opted for the latter. How good is that going to work: no idea. Can only say that even the VDV units are limited to operations by daylight, and lacking communications, training, and equipment to outmatch the ZSU on 1 for 1 basis. For example: lately, Ukrainians are monitoring a growing number of Russian armoured vehicles abandoned because they were in much too poor technical condition: were pulled out of mothballs and sent to the frontlines without necessary overhauls (arguably, the same is valid for up to a third of what NATO is sending to Ukraine….but, Ukrainians do not deploy broken Western stuff in combat without necessary checks and maintenance).
Bakhmut…. The 57th Motorised seems to have been inside Berkhivka, on 17-18 June, but was then hit by a severe Russian counterattack from three sides. This forced it back to south-western outskirts. South of Bakhmut, the 3rd Assault is still grinding in direction of Klishchivka…
Avdiivka…the ZSU is pushing into the area north of the town, approx. two kilometres north-east of Brevno and south of Krasnohorivka, and seems to have made some advances in direction of Novoselivka, back on 18 June.
Mariinka… the Russians are running local attacks into Krasnohorivka (north of Marinka), into Mariinka, and south of it, but all of that is ‘going nowhere’…
SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA (& SOUTH-WESTERN DONETSK)
Vasylivka (‘disclaimer’: that’s the eastern side of what used to be the ‘Kakhovka Sea’ until the Russian scum blew up the Kakhovka Dam, which is something half the ‘West’ still ‘cannot officially confirm’….usually because ‘it’s complex’….)…
On 16 June, the ZSU secured the ruins of the village of Lobkove. On 17 June, the ZSU attacked Pyalykhatky from two sides, causing panic between the Russians: indeed, the latter claimed that ‘Ukrainians wearing uniforms of the VSRF’ penetrated the ‘4th Military Base’ (VSRF: an unit usually stationed in South Ossetia), west of Luhove (that’s some 10km south of Kamianske and 10km south-west of Lobkove), ‘but’, that they ‘burned’ all the ‘militants’ – until it turned out these were their own troops. Then they fell silent.
Through 18 June, the Russians counterattacked, claiming massive losses to the Ukrainians. Think, they did cause lots of troubles, and destroyed some 7-8 armoured vehicles. However, Ukrainians brought in reinforcements, and attacked again, destroying a battalion of 300 of either the 4th Military Base or the Storm Ossetia Battalion, including its commander (less than 20 Russians came away). Some claim the actual designation of the unit was the ‘80th Brigade’, but I’m not sure about that.
On 19 June, the 128th Mountain Assault attacked Zherebianky from two sides (the place is held by the BARS-32) Shortly later, the VSRF launched a counterattack on Pyalykhatky (or rushed ‘reinforcements’ to the place because it didn’t know it was lost?): Ukrainians fell back to their starting positions and then threw the Russians back with losses in armour, while launching another attack from Pyalykhatky into a small forest on a low hill south-east of the place. Ironically, Russian contacts have confirmed the attack and the presence of the 128th Mountain Assault, nothing else, but: they’re not making jokes about this ZSU unit any more (the 128th is home-based in Melitupol and early during the war fought a terrific – but also sad – withdrawal battle from that town via Tokmak and Polohy to Hulyapole. because of this, the Russians regularly mocked it were publishing fantastic claims about its losses).
As of 20 June, the 128th was back to attacking into Zherebianky…and I wonder: is this going to prompt the 49th or the 58th CAA (not sure which is responsible for this area) into another ‘operational-level’ counterattack or not? …or was this already smashed by the ZSU artillery, while still some 10km south of the frontline, as some claim?
Novodanylivka….since 16 June, the ZSU was making a slow, but good advance in southern direction. First ‘they’ brought in ‘something’ that started suppressing the effects of the Russian electronic warfare. Apparently, this did suppress Lancets, too, even if not the Ka-52s or the Russian ATGMs (these were still, and regularly, scoring ‘kills’, until two days ago). Then the cleaning of additional lines through the minefields was completed. Plus demining around own positions. Took a lots of artillery support, to knock out whatever the Russians tried to use to hinder this effort. In turn, that enabled better manoeuvrability of ZSU troops and a sustained influx of supplies (the same wouldn’t work with reinforcements because pumping too much troops into a too small zone would be too dangerous).
Anyway, by 17 June, the ZSU reached the northern outskirts of Robotyne, in the south, and began a systematic (even if slow) decimation of the Russian garrison there. On 18 or 19 June, the VSRF reacted with a major counterattack and claims to have pushed Ukrainians some two kilometres back. Ever since, it appears to be ‘silent’ there. Further east, Ukrainians have continued widening the penetration through the Russian minefields by cleaning additional lines about 5-6km south of Mala Tokmachka.
Hulaypole….still not sure about what’s going on between Marfopil and Pryyutne, because both sides are releasing next to no news, except denials of enemy claims, and 0+0=0… Gauging by reports about captured ZSU troops and MRAPsa from the southern fringes of this area, I guess Ukrainians are raiding around Prechystivka, though…
Staromaiorske/Staromayorske… (formerly ‘Velyka Novoselivka area’ or the ‘Vremivka Bulge’, but I think there’s no point in determining the area by a place that’s meanwhile well away from the frontline)…
On 15 June, the ZSU began a push along most of the Russian line between Urozhaine and Kermenchyk, which resulted in some of its units reaching approaches to Kluchove and….’slightly further south-east’ (yes, ‘again’).….which prompted Pudding’s PRBS-machinery into another wave of reports about ‘massive Ukrainian losses’. Actually, the move really took the Russians by surprise. Not only because they’re still busy trying to secure the link to their ‘besieged’ garrison of Rivnopil, and wasting troops while ‘counterattacking’ Makarivka, but because it seems this attack was also supported by ‘somebody’ bringing ‘something’ related to electronic warfare to this area, and – at least temporarily – suppressing the activity of the Orlan+Zola+Lancet combination (such ‘things’ tend to overheat easily, when worked at full power for longer periods of time).
Net result: as of 19 June, the ZSU was ‘well in between’ Zavitne Bezhannya, and Kermenchyk, and pushing south, but: also in western direction, over the Mokri Yaly River, again…
Overall: the ZSU is still grinding, cautiously and methodically, through the (actual) 1st defence line in the south. Such approach is necessary in order to limit own losses to the bare minimum, while securing maximum possible support for assaulting troops: is a major switch in ‘tactics’, in comparison to early this month. The Russians are still counterattacking at every opportunity: sure, their lower- and mid-ranking officers are simply awful, and the mass of their units along the 1st line meanwhile reduced by at least a third. However, their training, communications, and planning are better than expected, and there is no doubt that their top commanders are attempting to exploit every single opportunity to cause losses to the ZSU. With other words: they still know what are they doing and have their troops under control. However, they’re hopelessly outmatched in nocturnal combat, and this is what the ZSU is exploiting to the maximum, meanwhile - exactly like the superior defence capability of its units: it seems that nowadays, thanks to superior training and fire-support, a single Ukrainian battalion can outfight two or even more of Russian equivalents.
-Tom Cooper
In the air… the PSU hit a VSRF deport in Volnovakha, yesterday, and the port of Berdyansk, followed by Vasilivka, this morning.
The Russians targeted the Kharkiv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih with Iskanders, early this morning (around 00.35hrs).
BATTLE OF DONBAS
Seems, yesterday was a day of major (and, often enough: massive) Russian counterattacks.
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina… North of Kupyansk, the VSRF attacked in the Synkivka area through the forest along the Oskil River in direction of Kupyansk. Pudding-fans are claiming ‘advance’, but haven’t found any kind of evidence for one: it’s the GenStab-U who reported that the Russians came to within 2,000m north of the town.
Kremina area…. the VDV and/or BARS attacked through the Serebyanka Forest. Might have made some minimal gains (100-200 metres), before they were thrown back to their starting positions.
Both efforts, plus a similar assault from Chornopopivka in the direction of Torske, were supported with massive artillery barrages and air strikes. Here an audioclip of the barrage on Torske: the Russian assault there was cut to pieces…
SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA (& SOUTH-WESTERN DONETSK)
Vasylivka... The Russians (apparently the 49th CAA), have launched a particularly strong counterattack on Pyatykhatky, and claim to have recovered the place, pushing Ukrainians back into Lobkove. Haven't seen any confirmation yet (on the contrary, the 128th spent much of the day yesterday with recovering damaged Russian tanks and BMPs).
Hulyaipole…The Russians counterattacked into the eastern flank of the Ukrainian advance into Robotyne and claim to have forced the ZSU out of the place. Actually, lost at least half a dozen of tanks and plenty of troops. Ukrainians also blew up a forward Russian ammo depot in Novoselivka.
Staromaiorske...Like most of the time the last week or so, the Russians launched two additional counterattacks into the western side of Makarivka - supported by deployment of CBUs - yesterday. Both were repelled. I've got no idea why are they still trying: the units they deploy are far too small for achieving anything, but: it’s ‘nice’ to see the 58th CAA squandering its reserves by rolling them downhill over open area. Tragically, the local landscape is meanwhile more reminiscent of that on the Moon - though littered with wreckage of destroyed armoured vehicles…
Further south, there's bitter fighting inside northern Urozhaine.
More worrying: on 20 June, the Russians seem to have re-entered Novodonetske. This enabled them to show-off with their first actually captured Western vehicles in this offensive. Like this AMX-10RC, or this (Turkish-made) Kirpi:
….and this Oshkosh M-ATV, ‘still intact enough’ to be towed away:
Kherson/Nova Kakhokva….the Russians seem to expect a major Ukrainian attack over the Dnipro. Indeed, this is how Russians now explaining the mining of the Kakhovka Dam: ‘Ukrainians did it, so they have it easier to cross the Dnipro’.
Arguably (or at least from one gets to hear from within Ukrainian ranks) the ZSU might have planned to cross, but ‘weeks ago’: indeed, that ‘plot’ was abandoned precisely because the Russians blew up the Kakhovka dam….
The Russians targeted the Kharkiv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih with Iskanders, early this morning (around 00.35hrs).
BATTLE OF DONBAS
Seems, yesterday was a day of major (and, often enough: massive) Russian counterattacks.
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina… North of Kupyansk, the VSRF attacked in the Synkivka area through the forest along the Oskil River in direction of Kupyansk. Pudding-fans are claiming ‘advance’, but haven’t found any kind of evidence for one: it’s the GenStab-U who reported that the Russians came to within 2,000m north of the town.
Kremina area…. the VDV and/or BARS attacked through the Serebyanka Forest. Might have made some minimal gains (100-200 metres), before they were thrown back to their starting positions.
Both efforts, plus a similar assault from Chornopopivka in the direction of Torske, were supported with massive artillery barrages and air strikes. Here an audioclip of the barrage on Torske: the Russian assault there was cut to pieces…
SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA (& SOUTH-WESTERN DONETSK)
Vasylivka... The Russians (apparently the 49th CAA), have launched a particularly strong counterattack on Pyatykhatky, and claim to have recovered the place, pushing Ukrainians back into Lobkove. Haven't seen any confirmation yet (on the contrary, the 128th spent much of the day yesterday with recovering damaged Russian tanks and BMPs).
Hulyaipole…The Russians counterattacked into the eastern flank of the Ukrainian advance into Robotyne and claim to have forced the ZSU out of the place. Actually, lost at least half a dozen of tanks and plenty of troops. Ukrainians also blew up a forward Russian ammo depot in Novoselivka.
Staromaiorske...Like most of the time the last week or so, the Russians launched two additional counterattacks into the western side of Makarivka - supported by deployment of CBUs - yesterday. Both were repelled. I've got no idea why are they still trying: the units they deploy are far too small for achieving anything, but: it’s ‘nice’ to see the 58th CAA squandering its reserves by rolling them downhill over open area. Tragically, the local landscape is meanwhile more reminiscent of that on the Moon - though littered with wreckage of destroyed armoured vehicles…
Further south, there's bitter fighting inside northern Urozhaine.
More worrying: on 20 June, the Russians seem to have re-entered Novodonetske. This enabled them to show-off with their first actually captured Western vehicles in this offensive. Like this AMX-10RC, or this (Turkish-made) Kirpi:
….and this Oshkosh M-ATV, ‘still intact enough’ to be towed away:
Kherson/Nova Kakhokva….the Russians seem to expect a major Ukrainian attack over the Dnipro. Indeed, this is how Russians now explaining the mining of the Kakhovka Dam: ‘Ukrainians did it, so they have it easier to cross the Dnipro’.
Arguably (or at least from one gets to hear from within Ukrainian ranks) the ZSU might have planned to cross, but ‘weeks ago’: indeed, that ‘plot’ was abandoned precisely because the Russians blew up the Kakhovka dam….
- Prahok
- I Am Losing It All to the Internet
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- Joined: Tue Sep 06, 2011 4:33 pm
End of Month 16 of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Russian Winter offensive culminated after 5 months, whilst the Ukrainian counter-offensive began. During the month tension rose between Russian Ministry of Defence and Wagner forces, with the situation escalating as of writing.
In the West, North and North East there were no changes on the ground.
In Belarus, there were no changes to the posture of Belarusian forces. Russia announced the movement of strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus.
In Luhansk, there has largely been positional fighting, with Russia moving additional offensive forces to the area and taking some forested areas South of Kremmina. Towards the end of the month there was increased offensive operations by Russia in an attempt to wrest the initiative from Ukraine’s counter-offensive in other theatres.
In Donetsk, Ukraine pushed Russian forces back on the flanks of Bakhmut, and though Ukraine retains a small portion of Bakhmut, the city remains primarily under Russian control with Wagner forces replaced by the Russian army. Near Adviika, Ukraine advanced beyond the 2014 line of control, the first time in the War this has occurred. Small, advances were made by Ukraine near Vuhledar, however essentially the front has not moved.
In Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine took back several villages however is encountering stiff Russian resistance and prepared defensive lines. Russia’s most heavily fortified positions lay several kilometres South of the current fighting. Concerns were raised by Ukraine at the end of the month of Russian mining of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
In Kherson, the Nova-Kakhova dam was blown with disastrous results. The flooding removed any immediate threat of a Ukrainian advance across the Dnipro, resulting in Russia transferring forces to the Zaporizhzhia front.
In Crimea, a strategic bridge linking Crimea to Kherson was hit. Satellite images soon after showed a pontoon bridge constructed under the bridge, suggesting the Russians were prepared for such an eventuality.
In the West, North and North East there were no changes on the ground.
In Belarus, there were no changes to the posture of Belarusian forces. Russia announced the movement of strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus.
In Luhansk, there has largely been positional fighting, with Russia moving additional offensive forces to the area and taking some forested areas South of Kremmina. Towards the end of the month there was increased offensive operations by Russia in an attempt to wrest the initiative from Ukraine’s counter-offensive in other theatres.
In Donetsk, Ukraine pushed Russian forces back on the flanks of Bakhmut, and though Ukraine retains a small portion of Bakhmut, the city remains primarily under Russian control with Wagner forces replaced by the Russian army. Near Adviika, Ukraine advanced beyond the 2014 line of control, the first time in the War this has occurred. Small, advances were made by Ukraine near Vuhledar, however essentially the front has not moved.
In Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine took back several villages however is encountering stiff Russian resistance and prepared defensive lines. Russia’s most heavily fortified positions lay several kilometres South of the current fighting. Concerns were raised by Ukraine at the end of the month of Russian mining of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
In Kherson, the Nova-Kakhova dam was blown with disastrous results. The flooding removed any immediate threat of a Ukrainian advance across the Dnipro, resulting in Russia transferring forces to the Zaporizhzhia front.
In Crimea, a strategic bridge linking Crimea to Kherson was hit. Satellite images soon after showed a pontoon bridge constructed under the bridge, suggesting the Russians were prepared for such an eventuality.
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