Ukraine
Putin seems to be using a new strategy of destroying infrastructure at arms length, something he could have done from the outset, to soften' things up. Missile strikes on power sub stations and a reservoir last week and today a strike close to a nuclear power station in southern Ukraine.
With winter coming, things look rather grim for Ukraine if basic needs can not be met through lack of functioning utilities and infrastructure in general.
You're a mad dog Putin, fuck you.
With winter coming, things look rather grim for Ukraine if basic needs can not be met through lack of functioning utilities and infrastructure in general.
You're a mad dog Putin, fuck you.
Russia recruiting now, $2700/month
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/1 ... r-soldiers
cue TEFLers exodus
on a side note, what do US or UK soldiers earn?
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/1 ... r-soldiers
cue TEFLers exodus
on a side note, what do US or UK soldiers earn?
Interesting post on Reddit
Russia is actually losing the war in Ukraine. The analysis from The Institute for the Study of War is some of the best and leased biased coverage around. To oversimplify, Russia's initial invasion went disastrously badly for Russia due to a total lack of preparation and logistics, military capabilities that are essentially fictional, and poor training.
The invasion was kept secret from all but the highest levels of the Russian army and disguised as a training exercise, so the people in charge of supply didn't know they needed to stockpile fuel, ammunition, and food to supply an actual invasion. So basically the army rolled out with half-empty fuel tanks, only enough bullets for training, food for the next day, and no long-range military radios. There are some theories that units were surprised to receive a much larger fuel allocation than they thought they needed and sold the extra on the black market prior to learning of the invasion.
The West's assessment of Russia's military capabilities was based on an understanding that they were regularly upgrading their equipment to try keep relative pace with the US and NATO countries. For example, they made the T-72 tank in 1972, then every 10 years or so since they've rolled out an upgraded armor package and new round for the gun that improved protection and effectiveness to current standards. It turns out that this never actually happened, and they're still using the original gun rounds from the cold war, and the "armor packages" they bolted on were just empty boxes. The fancy Active Protection System that was supposed to shoot down incoming missiles was just a carved piece of wood that was painted to look like an APS at a distance. And when the Russians started running out of tanks and opened the warehouses that supposedly held their reserves, they found them either empty or with vehicles that had been stripped for parts decades ago. They literally had to pull tanks out of museums to put in the fight.
The Russian soldiers in general were clearly not trained and prepared for an actual war with a country that had an organized military. The Russian army air defense units weren't trained to operate in an environment where they had enemy aircraft attacking at the same time friendly units flew close air support missions. This led to severe rates of friendly fire incidents and the Russian air force refusing to fly close air support missions for the ground forces. There are reports that when they were finally told they would be invading Ukraine, soldiers were told to pack dress uniforms for the victory parade rather than body armor, ammo, or extra food.
Initially, this all combined to mean that what everyone expected to be a Russian steamroll within 48 hours turned into a slaughter as the entire Russian army walked into an ambush.* The sheer size of the Russian military meant that they were able to make gains with time, but the war quickly stalled into battle of attrition that was not in Russia's favor. This means that every day Ukraine was doing more damage to Russia's military than they were taking, and Ukraine was receiving aid from NATO countries that meant they could replenish their stockpiles faster than Russia. The only way Russia could respond was to bombard civilian areas to try to break Ukraine's resolve. This didn't work, and eventually Russia's military was so weakened that they could no longer hold the areas they captured earlier in the war and they're now being pushed back towards the border.
*Bonus detail: As I mentioned, the Russian army didn't have military-grade long-range radios. So they told their fighting units to just rush ahead as fast as they could until they ran out of fuel and then stop, the resupply units would eventually catch up to them. So the Ukraine army waited until they did this, then ambushed the support units as they tried to catch up but while they were still out of radio range. So the fighting units just sat there getting increasingly worried wondering where their resupply was until the Ukraine army had time to destroy them. It's hard to put up a credible defense when you're surrounded, out of fuel and food, and didn't have many bullets to start with. So many of these units which were in theory Russia's best trained and equipped had to surrender immediately, without even being able to put up more than a token resistance. These desperate Russian units also started calling their headquarters and support units on civilian cellphones, which got us a lot of amusing recorded phone calls at the beginning of the war.
Bonus bonus edit: I feel like I didn't give enough credit to the armed forces of Ukraine for their heroic efforts in the above comment. As much as Russia shocked everyone by how much they underperformed, Ukraine did an absolutely amazing job in terms of the individual fighting grit and skill of their soldiers. They made the most with what they had, and worked in the information space both in terms of propaganda and using all possible intelligence sources to defeat their opponents. It's almost a total reversal from 2014 when Ukraine artillery units were destroyed because they installed ballistic calculation apps from the app store published by the Russian military, these days it's Russian units doing the dumb opsec mistakes and Ukraine capitalizing on them. Not to sound like Ukraine embarrassed themselves in 2014, honestly I never expected this invasion to happen because I thought Russia would have learned from how poorly they did, but I guess not.
Russia is actually losing the war in Ukraine. The analysis from The Institute for the Study of War is some of the best and leased biased coverage around. To oversimplify, Russia's initial invasion went disastrously badly for Russia due to a total lack of preparation and logistics, military capabilities that are essentially fictional, and poor training.
The invasion was kept secret from all but the highest levels of the Russian army and disguised as a training exercise, so the people in charge of supply didn't know they needed to stockpile fuel, ammunition, and food to supply an actual invasion. So basically the army rolled out with half-empty fuel tanks, only enough bullets for training, food for the next day, and no long-range military radios. There are some theories that units were surprised to receive a much larger fuel allocation than they thought they needed and sold the extra on the black market prior to learning of the invasion.
The West's assessment of Russia's military capabilities was based on an understanding that they were regularly upgrading their equipment to try keep relative pace with the US and NATO countries. For example, they made the T-72 tank in 1972, then every 10 years or so since they've rolled out an upgraded armor package and new round for the gun that improved protection and effectiveness to current standards. It turns out that this never actually happened, and they're still using the original gun rounds from the cold war, and the "armor packages" they bolted on were just empty boxes. The fancy Active Protection System that was supposed to shoot down incoming missiles was just a carved piece of wood that was painted to look like an APS at a distance. And when the Russians started running out of tanks and opened the warehouses that supposedly held their reserves, they found them either empty or with vehicles that had been stripped for parts decades ago. They literally had to pull tanks out of museums to put in the fight.
The Russian soldiers in general were clearly not trained and prepared for an actual war with a country that had an organized military. The Russian army air defense units weren't trained to operate in an environment where they had enemy aircraft attacking at the same time friendly units flew close air support missions. This led to severe rates of friendly fire incidents and the Russian air force refusing to fly close air support missions for the ground forces. There are reports that when they were finally told they would be invading Ukraine, soldiers were told to pack dress uniforms for the victory parade rather than body armor, ammo, or extra food.
Initially, this all combined to mean that what everyone expected to be a Russian steamroll within 48 hours turned into a slaughter as the entire Russian army walked into an ambush.* The sheer size of the Russian military meant that they were able to make gains with time, but the war quickly stalled into battle of attrition that was not in Russia's favor. This means that every day Ukraine was doing more damage to Russia's military than they were taking, and Ukraine was receiving aid from NATO countries that meant they could replenish their stockpiles faster than Russia. The only way Russia could respond was to bombard civilian areas to try to break Ukraine's resolve. This didn't work, and eventually Russia's military was so weakened that they could no longer hold the areas they captured earlier in the war and they're now being pushed back towards the border.
*Bonus detail: As I mentioned, the Russian army didn't have military-grade long-range radios. So they told their fighting units to just rush ahead as fast as they could until they ran out of fuel and then stop, the resupply units would eventually catch up to them. So the Ukraine army waited until they did this, then ambushed the support units as they tried to catch up but while they were still out of radio range. So the fighting units just sat there getting increasingly worried wondering where their resupply was until the Ukraine army had time to destroy them. It's hard to put up a credible defense when you're surrounded, out of fuel and food, and didn't have many bullets to start with. So many of these units which were in theory Russia's best trained and equipped had to surrender immediately, without even being able to put up more than a token resistance. These desperate Russian units also started calling their headquarters and support units on civilian cellphones, which got us a lot of amusing recorded phone calls at the beginning of the war.
Bonus bonus edit: I feel like I didn't give enough credit to the armed forces of Ukraine for their heroic efforts in the above comment. As much as Russia shocked everyone by how much they underperformed, Ukraine did an absolutely amazing job in terms of the individual fighting grit and skill of their soldiers. They made the most with what they had, and worked in the information space both in terms of propaganda and using all possible intelligence sources to defeat their opponents. It's almost a total reversal from 2014 when Ukraine artillery units were destroyed because they installed ballistic calculation apps from the app store published by the Russian military, these days it's Russian units doing the dumb opsec mistakes and Ukraine capitalizing on them. Not to sound like Ukraine embarrassed themselves in 2014, honestly I never expected this invasion to happen because I thought Russia would have learned from how poorly they did, but I guess not.
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- Prahok
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End of Week 30 of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the initiative remains firmly with Ukraine. Officials from the Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples Republics called for immediate referendums to join Russia, as have officials in Russia controlled Kherson. Whilst Russian media pundits welcomed the news, to date there has been no response from the Kremlin.
To the West and North there were no changes. Belarus announced further military drills, something that has been occurring almost without a break for the past few months. Periodic shelling of border cities and towns continues.
Along the Luhansk front, Ukrainian forces cross the Oskil River in Kupyansk and captured the Eastern half of the city. Further South, Ukrainian forces pushed North East and East from the Southern edge of the Oskilski Reservoir, taking several villages. The key town of Lyman is still under Russian control, though is being assaulted from two directions. Ukrainian forces captured Bilohorivka, marking a return to Luhansk Oblast, and are reportedly closing in on Lysychansk.
Along the Donetsk front, Russian forces continue to make incremental progress towards Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces recaptured minor territory further South close to Donetsk City. In all there has been little movement along this front, though casualties for both sides are reportedly high.
Along the Zaporizhzhia front there was little change, with some incremental advances by Ukrainian forces. Partisan activity in Melitopol and Berdyansk was high with several high-profile assassinations over the week.
On the Kherson front there has been some movement, with minor gains made by Ukraine along all three of their primary axis of advance. Russian attempts to flood the Inhulets River by destroying the dam in Kryvyi Rih resulted in a rise in the level of the river. Reportedly supply of Ukrainian forces in the Inhulets Bridgehead was hampered but not cut, with Ukraine managing to expand the bridgehead. Russian forces at Nova Khakova were in the process of filling the lock at the dam with rubble in order to create a crossing following the destruction of the bridge by HIMARS.
Putin was scheduled to make a speech last night, though this has been delayed until possibly later this day. Speculation is rife amongst Russian milbloggers regarding this being an announcement of a general or partial mobilisation.
To the West and North there were no changes. Belarus announced further military drills, something that has been occurring almost without a break for the past few months. Periodic shelling of border cities and towns continues.
Along the Luhansk front, Ukrainian forces cross the Oskil River in Kupyansk and captured the Eastern half of the city. Further South, Ukrainian forces pushed North East and East from the Southern edge of the Oskilski Reservoir, taking several villages. The key town of Lyman is still under Russian control, though is being assaulted from two directions. Ukrainian forces captured Bilohorivka, marking a return to Luhansk Oblast, and are reportedly closing in on Lysychansk.
Along the Donetsk front, Russian forces continue to make incremental progress towards Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces recaptured minor territory further South close to Donetsk City. In all there has been little movement along this front, though casualties for both sides are reportedly high.
Along the Zaporizhzhia front there was little change, with some incremental advances by Ukrainian forces. Partisan activity in Melitopol and Berdyansk was high with several high-profile assassinations over the week.
On the Kherson front there has been some movement, with minor gains made by Ukraine along all three of their primary axis of advance. Russian attempts to flood the Inhulets River by destroying the dam in Kryvyi Rih resulted in a rise in the level of the river. Reportedly supply of Ukrainian forces in the Inhulets Bridgehead was hampered but not cut, with Ukraine managing to expand the bridgehead. Russian forces at Nova Khakova were in the process of filling the lock at the dam with rubble in order to create a crossing following the destruction of the bridge by HIMARS.
Putin was scheduled to make a speech last night, though this has been delayed until possibly later this day. Speculation is rife amongst Russian milbloggers regarding this being an announcement of a general or partial mobilisation.
Partial mobilisation announced by Putler today, commencing immediately. He is becoming increasingly paranoid, saying the west wants to destroy Russia so Russia has to defend itself.
Shit's gonna hit the fan.
Shit's gonna hit the fan.
- Prahok
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A partial mobilisation doesn't mean much in of itself. Russia desperately needs more troops, however its legal framework precludes the movement of conscripts out of Russia without a declaration of War (if my reading of the law is correct). Also, training capacity has been degraded (confirmed by the performance of the 3rd Army Corps), which may explain why the partial declaration is restricted to reservists and those with military experience.Dylan Quint wrote: ↑Wed Sep 21, 2022 1:29 pmShit's gonna hit the fan.
The primarily issue becomes one of annexation. If Russia declares parts of Ukraine as Russian territory (something Putin spoke of in his speech) it creates a loophole in the domestic legal framework to move conscripts into battle, as according to Russian domestic law they haven't left Russia.
Should such a scenario unfold then Russia would have significantly raised its stakes without raising Ukraine's (Ukraine has been in an all or nothing fight from the outset). It isn't certain that Putin will go down this path as the domestic risks are high, particularly once conscripts from Moscow & St Petersburg start dying in large numbers.
I want one of those Snipex Alligator guns.
14.5x114mm cartridge Wow.
14.5x114mm cartridge Wow.
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pew, pew, pew, pew!
Any 'constraints' that supposedly existed have clearly been over-ridden by Putler's cronies, under his direction.Prahok wrote: ↑Wed Sep 21, 2022 4:25 pmA partial mobilisation doesn't mean much in of itself. Russia desperately needs more troops, however its legal framework precludes the movement of conscripts out of Russia without a declaration of War (if my reading of the law is correct). Also, training capacity has been degraded (confirmed by the performance of the 3rd Army Corps), which may explain why the partial declaration is restricted to reservists and those with military experience.Dylan Quint wrote: ↑Wed Sep 21, 2022 1:29 pmShit's gonna hit the fan.
The primarily issue becomes one of annexation. If Russia declares parts of Ukraine as Russian territory (something Putin spoke of in his speech) it creates a loophole in the domestic legal framework to move conscripts into battle, as according to Russian domestic law they haven't left Russia.
Should such a scenario unfold then Russia would have significantly raised its stakes without raising Ukraine's (Ukraine has been in an all or nothing fight from the outset). It isn't certain that Putin will go down this path as the domestic risks are high, particularly once conscripts from Moscow & St Petersburg start dying in large numbers.
Many or fhese conscripts are not reservists, have had no military training whatsoever and first thing they are taught is how to 'self bandage', because many casualties are 'bleed outs'.
Putler already talking about expanding draft by another 700k after this first lot get carved up.
Another curve ball up his sleeve is when the regions 'voting' become part ot Russia, any attempt to reclaim it will be perceived as a Nato attack on the Motherland.Prahok wrote:
The primarily issue becomes one of annexation. If Russia declares parts of Ukraine as Russian territory (something Putin spoke of in his speech) it creates a loophole in the domestic legal framework to move conscripts into battle, as according to Russian domestic law they haven't left Russia.
One can hope Putin gets taken out by a disgruntled Russian sniper. It'd solve many problems at once.
- Prahok
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It certainly heightens tensions as further Ukrainian gains will be seen by nationalists as the Kremlin losing parts of Russia itself (perhaps less so the general population, depends on how it is framed in Russian state media). The fallout from that is uncertain.Dylan Quint wrote: ↑Sat Sep 24, 2022 5:24 pmAnother curve ball up his sleeve is when the regions 'voting' become part ot Russia, any attempt to reclaim it will be perceived as a Nato attack on the Motherland.
Another issue is Russia will possibly view Ukrainian controlled parts of each oblast as occupied territory, making any long-term peace deal problematic even if Ukraine retakes the entire country.
Today is day 214 of Putin’s three day war, and the only people scared of the Russian Army are young Russian men of call-up age.
- Prahok
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Week 31 of the Russo-Ukrainian War and Russia has undergone a partial mobilisation with reports of mobilised soldiers already in the ranks of Russian POWs, having been rushed in to fill critical man-power shortages. Referenda in all the areas under Russian control are now closing, with expectation of an announced annexation by Russia in the coming week.
In the West, North and Kharkiv there were no changes.
Along the Luhansk front Russia committed its Airforce to assist units facing the Ukrainian advance, resulting in a number of aircraft downed through the week. The Ukrainians advanced East of the Oskil River in two areas to the North and are having success further South, pushing Northwards towards Borova and Eastwards towards the Zherebets River. Developments in this theatre are rapid and suggest Russia is withdrawing some units to form a new defensive line further East. Further South, Ukrainian forces crossed the Siverskidonetsk River with units approaching Torske and Kreminna (though the size & capacity of these units is uncertain) placing Russian forces in the strategic town of Lyman at risk of encirclement.
In Donetsk there was heavy fighting as Russia continues efforts to take Bakhmut. There were reportedly some minor gains made by Russian forces South of the city, with Ukraine retaking some minor positions to the East (possibly near Soledar). In all there hasn’t been much movement on this front, though fighting is reportedly fierce.
In Zaporizhzhia there were few changes with Ukrainian forces continuing to make incremental advances South. Speculation regarding Ukrainian intentions in this theatre remains high.
In Kherson there were no reported changes. Information in this theatre remains difficult to obtain. Recently mobilised Russian soldiers arrived in Crimea, reportedly destined for Kherson, however as they received minimal to no training it is unclear as to how they are intended to be used.
In the West, North and Kharkiv there were no changes.
Along the Luhansk front Russia committed its Airforce to assist units facing the Ukrainian advance, resulting in a number of aircraft downed through the week. The Ukrainians advanced East of the Oskil River in two areas to the North and are having success further South, pushing Northwards towards Borova and Eastwards towards the Zherebets River. Developments in this theatre are rapid and suggest Russia is withdrawing some units to form a new defensive line further East. Further South, Ukrainian forces crossed the Siverskidonetsk River with units approaching Torske and Kreminna (though the size & capacity of these units is uncertain) placing Russian forces in the strategic town of Lyman at risk of encirclement.
In Donetsk there was heavy fighting as Russia continues efforts to take Bakhmut. There were reportedly some minor gains made by Russian forces South of the city, with Ukraine retaking some minor positions to the East (possibly near Soledar). In all there hasn’t been much movement on this front, though fighting is reportedly fierce.
In Zaporizhzhia there were few changes with Ukrainian forces continuing to make incremental advances South. Speculation regarding Ukrainian intentions in this theatre remains high.
In Kherson there were no reported changes. Information in this theatre remains difficult to obtain. Recently mobilised Russian soldiers arrived in Crimea, reportedly destined for Kherson, however as they received minimal to no training it is unclear as to how they are intended to be used.
Sorry for the lack of details, but had to ‘zoom-out’, because this battlefield is meanwhile that large. From north towards south, and ‘in essence’:
1.) Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU) have punched out of their two bridgeheads in the Kupyansk area. The one in the north, opposite to Dvorichne, is still relatively small, and it took them few days to liberate and secure Tavilzhanka and Hryankyivka, but meanwhile they’re pushing on Lyman Pershyi and Vilshana.
2.) The major bridgehead — the one into eastern side of Kupyansk — was expanded handsomely, the last two days, with Ukrainians securing Synkivka in the north, Petropavlivka in the east, and all of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi in the south.
One can expect these two bridgeheads to become one in the coming days (if this is not already the case), and then things to get only much worse for the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army.
3.) Putin has ordered all of the Russian Armed Forces (VSRF), his PMCs, and Separatists ‘not a step back’, and is rushing whatever troops he can only scratch together into the battle. Especially into eastern Kharkiv, slightly less so to the Bakhmut area. Over the last week, two major ‘groups of forces’ could be identified as being in the process of rebuilt with help of reservists and then rushed to Ukraine:
3rd Motor Rifle Division (MRD), in Belgorod, and
20th Guards Motor Rifle Division (GMRD), in Rostov na Donu.
….with results that must’ve been expected. Perhaps the ‘best example’ (or ‘worst’, from the Russian point of view) was what happened to the 237th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 3rd MRD. This had one of its battalion tactical groups rebuilt with mobilised reservists given less than 24 hours of ‘refresher training’. Tell me what you want, but all the trust in Christianity couldn’t have helped them: unsurprisingly, that BTG was smashed to pieces with ease, losing dozens of vehicles and most of troops (this was the clash that then prompted Ukrainians to wonder why are the Russians even trying, 2–3 days ago). AFAIK, ZSU was still busy collecting all the stuff they’ve left behind, as of yesterday: no surprise there are people who say there’s nobody scared of the VSRF any more, than Russian reservists…
A captured BMP-2 of the 237th TR being towed to repairs by its new owners.
4.) Meanwhile, some three days ago, first reports surfaced about trains carrying reservists hurriedly organised into BTGs of the 20th GMRD being rushed from Volgograd to Rostov. I expected them to pass Luhansk yesterday, and reach the Svatove area today, but… well, then a report arrived about Ukrainians HIMARS-ing one of trains in question as this was about to reach Luhansk…. and now all one gets to hear is about ‘lots of 200s’ (Russian radio-code for ‘killed in action’). Think, it might take a few days longer for…whatever was left of the 20th GMRD to reach the battlefield. If at all…
Further south and west…
5.) While the Ukrainian 25th Airborne (which is, actually, a mechanised formation, just like all of the Russian VDV-troops) is doing what such formations can do the best (i.e. ‘roam enemy rear somewhere in between of Borova and Svatove, wreaking havoc as it goes’) meanwhile, additional ZSU troops have pushed from Pisky-Radkivski north and, reportedly, already liberated the first few villages. There are rumors about Ukrainian push into Luhansk somewhere in the Zalyman-Krasnorichenske area, but haven’t found (nor heard) any confirmation for this, yet.
6.) Two days ago, the ZSU — in its rush to take part in Putin’s referendum in Luhansk — liberated Nove. The Russians then claimed to have counterattacked and recovered the village (seems, they wouldn’t let anybody else have fun, tsk, tsk). Meanwhile, RUMINT has it Ukrainians drove into their northern rear and are ‘somewhere between Ivanivka and Kolodyazi’. They should have liberated Zelena Dolyna, too (haven’t seen any evidence for that yet (too short on time), and then Ridkodub, north of Lyman (that is confirmed, meanwhile, and resulted in the capture of quite a few abandoned — but intact — T-72s).
7.) Drobysheve appears to be still in Russian hands, but (‘at least’) de-facto surrounded. At least there’s no end of Russian complaints about the ZSU driving up and down in between of that village and Lyman.
8.) Lyman is still under Russian control, but this morning RUMINT had it that Ukrainians punched through the Russian frontline somewhere between that town and Yampil, or between Zarichne-Torkse and further east (?) — reaching the road to Kremina. Haven’t found time to search for evidence, but have no doubts that at least Ukrainian special forces are raiding that road — for days already.
Mind: through all of this time, Ukrainian special forces are roaming the Russian rear — especially by night — in the entire area from Kupyansk down to Kremina (at least): planting mines, ambushing convoys, capturing one or another Russian soldier (always useful for intelligence) — and then disappearing before the enemy knows what’s going on. Thus, the situation is not only ‘fluid’ but, from the Russian point of view, ‘extremely uncertain’, and the defences of certain places collapsing ‘all of a sudden’.
One way or the other, with this the entire group of Russian forces in the Lyman area is — definitely — in deep trouble. I’m still not sure who exactly is in command there: southern side should be under the control of the I Army Corps (VSRF in control of Separatists), but the northern side….? Seems, is a mix of troops from the 1st Guards Tanks Army, 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army, the 41st Combined Arms Army and whatever reservists Putin was able to bring there by now. More likely, it simply doesn’t matter: none of local army commanders is in control, but, as usually, Putin. And, thanks to his micromanagement and frequent break-downs in the Russian chain of combat even the South OSK can’t say, right now, where should it send troops and where supplies…. (South OSK = Southern Military District of the VSRF; theoretically, the top Russian military authority for Ukraine). …which — hand on heart — is ‘good that way’.
That all said: weather is a growing problem. It’s raining and the soil is soft. ‘General Mud’ is taking over the control and both sides are experiencing growing problem with off-road movement of their mechanisation.
1.) Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU) have punched out of their two bridgeheads in the Kupyansk area. The one in the north, opposite to Dvorichne, is still relatively small, and it took them few days to liberate and secure Tavilzhanka and Hryankyivka, but meanwhile they’re pushing on Lyman Pershyi and Vilshana.
2.) The major bridgehead — the one into eastern side of Kupyansk — was expanded handsomely, the last two days, with Ukrainians securing Synkivka in the north, Petropavlivka in the east, and all of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi in the south.
One can expect these two bridgeheads to become one in the coming days (if this is not already the case), and then things to get only much worse for the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army.
3.) Putin has ordered all of the Russian Armed Forces (VSRF), his PMCs, and Separatists ‘not a step back’, and is rushing whatever troops he can only scratch together into the battle. Especially into eastern Kharkiv, slightly less so to the Bakhmut area. Over the last week, two major ‘groups of forces’ could be identified as being in the process of rebuilt with help of reservists and then rushed to Ukraine:
3rd Motor Rifle Division (MRD), in Belgorod, and
20th Guards Motor Rifle Division (GMRD), in Rostov na Donu.
….with results that must’ve been expected. Perhaps the ‘best example’ (or ‘worst’, from the Russian point of view) was what happened to the 237th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 3rd MRD. This had one of its battalion tactical groups rebuilt with mobilised reservists given less than 24 hours of ‘refresher training’. Tell me what you want, but all the trust in Christianity couldn’t have helped them: unsurprisingly, that BTG was smashed to pieces with ease, losing dozens of vehicles and most of troops (this was the clash that then prompted Ukrainians to wonder why are the Russians even trying, 2–3 days ago). AFAIK, ZSU was still busy collecting all the stuff they’ve left behind, as of yesterday: no surprise there are people who say there’s nobody scared of the VSRF any more, than Russian reservists…
A captured BMP-2 of the 237th TR being towed to repairs by its new owners.
4.) Meanwhile, some three days ago, first reports surfaced about trains carrying reservists hurriedly organised into BTGs of the 20th GMRD being rushed from Volgograd to Rostov. I expected them to pass Luhansk yesterday, and reach the Svatove area today, but… well, then a report arrived about Ukrainians HIMARS-ing one of trains in question as this was about to reach Luhansk…. and now all one gets to hear is about ‘lots of 200s’ (Russian radio-code for ‘killed in action’). Think, it might take a few days longer for…whatever was left of the 20th GMRD to reach the battlefield. If at all…
Further south and west…
5.) While the Ukrainian 25th Airborne (which is, actually, a mechanised formation, just like all of the Russian VDV-troops) is doing what such formations can do the best (i.e. ‘roam enemy rear somewhere in between of Borova and Svatove, wreaking havoc as it goes’) meanwhile, additional ZSU troops have pushed from Pisky-Radkivski north and, reportedly, already liberated the first few villages. There are rumors about Ukrainian push into Luhansk somewhere in the Zalyman-Krasnorichenske area, but haven’t found (nor heard) any confirmation for this, yet.
6.) Two days ago, the ZSU — in its rush to take part in Putin’s referendum in Luhansk — liberated Nove. The Russians then claimed to have counterattacked and recovered the village (seems, they wouldn’t let anybody else have fun, tsk, tsk). Meanwhile, RUMINT has it Ukrainians drove into their northern rear and are ‘somewhere between Ivanivka and Kolodyazi’. They should have liberated Zelena Dolyna, too (haven’t seen any evidence for that yet (too short on time), and then Ridkodub, north of Lyman (that is confirmed, meanwhile, and resulted in the capture of quite a few abandoned — but intact — T-72s).
7.) Drobysheve appears to be still in Russian hands, but (‘at least’) de-facto surrounded. At least there’s no end of Russian complaints about the ZSU driving up and down in between of that village and Lyman.
8.) Lyman is still under Russian control, but this morning RUMINT had it that Ukrainians punched through the Russian frontline somewhere between that town and Yampil, or between Zarichne-Torkse and further east (?) — reaching the road to Kremina. Haven’t found time to search for evidence, but have no doubts that at least Ukrainian special forces are raiding that road — for days already.
Mind: through all of this time, Ukrainian special forces are roaming the Russian rear — especially by night — in the entire area from Kupyansk down to Kremina (at least): planting mines, ambushing convoys, capturing one or another Russian soldier (always useful for intelligence) — and then disappearing before the enemy knows what’s going on. Thus, the situation is not only ‘fluid’ but, from the Russian point of view, ‘extremely uncertain’, and the defences of certain places collapsing ‘all of a sudden’.
One way or the other, with this the entire group of Russian forces in the Lyman area is — definitely — in deep trouble. I’m still not sure who exactly is in command there: southern side should be under the control of the I Army Corps (VSRF in control of Separatists), but the northern side….? Seems, is a mix of troops from the 1st Guards Tanks Army, 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army, the 41st Combined Arms Army and whatever reservists Putin was able to bring there by now. More likely, it simply doesn’t matter: none of local army commanders is in control, but, as usually, Putin. And, thanks to his micromanagement and frequent break-downs in the Russian chain of combat even the South OSK can’t say, right now, where should it send troops and where supplies…. (South OSK = Southern Military District of the VSRF; theoretically, the top Russian military authority for Ukraine). …which — hand on heart — is ‘good that way’.
That all said: weather is a growing problem. It’s raining and the soil is soft. ‘General Mud’ is taking over the control and both sides are experiencing growing problem with off-road movement of their mechanisation.
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